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THE ROLE OF APPELLATE COURTS IN
MANDATORY SENTENCING SCHEMES*

Larry I. Palmer**
I.

INTRODUCTION

During an era of judicial activism in America, appellate
courts have promulgated detailed rules for scrutinizing police conduct and trial court holdings, while they have by and large ignored the issues surrounding sentencing. As a consequence,
public and scholarly expositions of the criminal process in recent
years have focused on appellate review of pre-trial and trial decisions. 1 Since the articulated goal of this effort has been the protection of individualliberty, 2 it is surprising, and unfortunate, that so
little attention has been devoted to post-trial decisions, which also
affect that liberty.
A.

The Policy of Discretion in Sentencing -

The willingness to subject pre-trial and trial decisions to intensive appellate review while withholding appellate scrutiny
from decisions about sentencing and parole reflects a peculiarly
American way of handling conflicting goals. By tolerating the co. existence of "legally bound agents"-police and trial judges-and
• This Article is part of a larger work on the general problems of sentencing.
Part of the research done in conjunction with this Article was supported by a grant
from the Ford Foundation. The opinion and conclusions expressed are those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions or conclusions of the Ford Foundation.
The author would also like to express his appreciation to Alan P. Young and
Matthew J. Finch, students at Cornell Law School, for their research assistance in
preparation of this Article.
•• Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. A.B. 1966, Harvard; LL.B. 1969,
Yale.
l. Palmer, A Model of Criminal Dispositions: An Alternative to Official Discretion
in Sentencing, 62 GEo. L.J. l (1973) [hereinafter cited as Palmer, A Model of Criminal
Dispositions).
2. /d. at 2.
© 1979 by Larry I. Palmer.
All Rights Reserved.
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"free agents"-prison officials, parole board members, and sentencing judges-society attempts to satisfy its desires for both social control and the protection of the rights of the accused. It is
acknowledged that the transgressor should be subject to social
control because of what he has done and also that his rights and
individuality should be protected in the process. The system of
guilt determination is infused with broad notions of "due process"
which imply that "legal" rather than "factual" guilt should ultimately determine who will be subject to state control. On the
other hand, sentencing and corrections decisions are guided by the
desire to "individualize punishment." 3
Thus, the sentencing judge is given broad discretion by legislative enactments designed to permit him to tailor the sentence to
fit the convicted criminal. One argument asserted in defense of
this policy is that the individualization of punishment through a
system of free agents best achieves the goals of "reformation and
rehabilitation." 4 If a sentence is ill-suited to a particular offender,
the sentencing judge is always subject to reversal for abuse of discretion. Under this view, however, such instances of appellate
court intervention should be rare since judge's decisions are infrequently reversed for abuse of discretion.
Confidence in the efficacy of a policy which rests sentencing
discretion in trial judges has led to the creation of other free
agents. Thus, correctional officials have been given broad discretion in their application of penal laws to criminal offenders, and
various legal doctrines have been developed to inhibit the judiciary from influencing or modifying the actions of prison and parole
officials. 5 Indeed, such confidence raises a further argument in
support of judicial non-reviewability of the practices of these free
agents. This rational is essentially one of institutional competence.
It is often argued that the adoption of any particular penal
policy to control sentencing judges and correctional officials in
their dealings with offenders is simply not a judicial function. 6
3. See generally id. at 1-6.
4. /d. at 3-4.
5. See Note, Beyond the Ken o.f the Courts: A Critique o.f Judicial Rifusalto Review the Complaints o.f Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 ( 1963).
6. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,406-11 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun's personal distaste for the death penalty was explicitly
stated: "[w]ere I a legislator, I would vote against the death penalty . . . . " /d. at 406.
He saw his judicial role differently:
I do not sit on these cases, however as a legislator, responsive, at least in
part, to the will of constituents. Our task here, as must so frequently be
emphasized and re-emphasized, is to pass upon the constitutionality of
legislation that has been enacted and that is challenged. This is the sole
task for judges.
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Rather, the enactment of specific policies to guide correctional officials or sentencing judges is uniquely within the competence of
the legislature. Following this line of analysis, a growing number
of legislatures have attempted to reform sentencing and correctional practices through the enactment of a variety of mandatory
sentencing schemes. 7
The position advocated here, however, is that the post-conviction treatment of individuals must be subject to legal review by
the appellate courts. Convicted persons justifiably may be subject
to society's control, but the need to control the criminal does not
warrant the unregulated use of mandatory sentences. In fact, as
will be demonstrated later, some legislative attempts to limit discretion through mandatory sentencing schemes serve only to shift
discretionary decision making from one sentencing official to
other decision makers. 8 Furthermore, the convicted person is protected by a practice of "individualized punishment" only when the
appellate courts actively participate in the administration of sanctions.9 The entire doctrine of official discretion needs to be replaced by a new mode of analysis compatible with modern views
of the goals of the criminal law. In effect, a new jurisprudence of
sentencing is needed. 10
B.

Discretion and Assumptions about American Criminal Law

The alternative method of legal analysis proposed here stems
from the belief that the discretion of sentencing officials should be
governed by legal standards developed to insure the fairness and
efficacy of post-conviction treatment. This method of analysis is
based on four assumptions about modern American criminal law.
First, the method posits a distinction between "dispositive" and
"adjudicative" decision making within American criminal law.
/d. at 410-11.
7. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203 (West Supp. 1979); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 775.087(2) (West Supp. 1979); MAsS. ANN. LAWS ch. 269, § 10 (Michie/Law. Co-op
Supp. 1978).
See also TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING:
FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT (1976) [hereinafter cited as FAIR AND CERTAIN
PUNISHMENT); A. YON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS: REPORT OF THE CoMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF INCARCERATION (1976) [hereinafter
cited as DOING JuSTICE). According to the National Institute of Law Enforcement
and Criminal Justice, study solicitation document of August 24,_ 1977, _at least 40
states are considering some form of determinate sentencing to supplant their current
sentencing systems. For a discussion of various scholarly works on determinate sentencing, see Zimring, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 6 HASTINGS CENTER
REP., lNST. Soc'Y, ETHICS & LIFE SCI. 13 (1976).
8. See notes 168-80 & accompanying text infra.
9. See notes 181-83 & accompanying text infra.
10. See generally Palmer, A Model o/ Criminal Dispositions, note I supra; see also
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
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The term "disposition" includes any decision in which an official
'oLthe legal system is empowered to exercise direct control over
another individual. 11 Under this definition, trial judge sentencing
decisions are part of a larger category of legal decisions that includes decisions by prison and parole officials and even decisions
that deprive individuals of their liberty through the civil process. 12
"Adjudication," on the other hand, includes all issues that are decided at trial and on appellate review of the trial process. Thus,
issues concerning the exclusion of evidence, instruction of juries,
and standards of proof are part of adjudicative decision making. 13
Second, since the disposition of criminals is assumed to serve
functions different from the adjudication of criminality, separate
legal standards should govern the two types of decisions. The distinction between adjudication and disposition is a critical analytical device for understanding the effect of major innovations in
American criminal law decision making. For instance, when this
distinction is kept in mind, the "right to counsel" cases decided by
the United States Supreme Court are better understood. 14 A prophylactic requirement of counsel at triali 5 as a part of due process
and the lack of such a requirement for probation or parole revocation hearings 16 under the same due process rubric are partially
explained by the different kinds of legal decision making involved
in adjudication and disposition.n
Third, in order to integrate the various purposes served by
disposition and adjudication, a method of explicitly analyzing the
interests or values served by the criminal law is needed. 18 This
II. See generally Palmer, A Model o/ Criminal Dispositions, note I supra.
12. ld. McNeil v. Director, Patuxent lnst., 407 U.S. 245 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972) (all discussing the
institutional limitations on the use of civil dispositions).
13. This definition of adjudication is in many respects similar to the ideal of legal
guilt developed in the late Professor Packer's Due Process Model. See H. PACKER,
THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 149-72 (1968). The major divergence between Professor Packer's concept of legal guilt and the present definition of adjudication lies in the definitions of reviewing functions in criminal law decision making.
Packer assumes that direct review of criminal convictions and collateral review of
criminal convictions by way of habeas corpus can be analyzed under the same rubric.
ld. at 227-38. This Article suggests that these functions ought to be separate. See
Palmer, Implementing the Obligation o/ Advocacy in Review of Criminal Convictions,
65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 267 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Palmer, Advocacy].
14. Palmer, Advocacy, supra note 13, at 274.
15. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (due process right to
counsel in felony trial).
16. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (no due process right to counsel
in probation revocation proceedings).
17. See generally Palmer, Advocacy, note 13 supra.
18. Palmer, A Model of Criminal Dispositions, supra note I, at 9-35. This method
of analysis of the interests protected by the criminal law should not be confused with
Professor Fletcher's characterizations of "socially protected interests." See Fletcher,
The Metamorphosis o/Larceny, 89 HARV. L. REV. 469, 519 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
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method of analysis should seek to look behind the usual labels of
"crime control," "due process," "crime prevention," and "social
control" in discussing sentencing issues. More specifically, when
dealing with issues of disposition, a method is required that considers both the interests underlying legislative formulation of particular criminal offenses as well as "[t]he policies underlying
court-developed constitutional limitations on criminal adjudication" 19 and disposition. 20
For example, in analyzing the policies underlying homicide
in its modern context, one would consider not only recent legislative innovations, but also recent constitutional pronouncements.
These would include not only Supreme Court opinions regarding
the death penalty for murder, 21 but also those cases involving
methods of proof in homicide. 22 While such an analysis is beyond
the scope of this Article, it can be said that this analysis of homicide would involve an examination of the particular ways in
which the values of human life and individual liberty2 3 are promoted through the processes of criminal adjudication and disposition. Broadly speaking, this method of analysis is a means of
integrating the substance and process of modern criminal law decision making. 24
Fletcher, Larceny]. Professor Fletcher identifies what he calls a "nineteenth century
preference for classifying crimes as intrusions against specific socially protected interests." He goes on to suggest that a view of substantive criminal law as protection
against certain interests, such as life, personal security, or property, makes moral concerns, such as betrayal of a friend, insignificant. Under the analysis proposed in this
Article, there is no a priori reason why moral concerns would not be part of the value
analysis. For instance, the analysis of the crime of rape requires analysis of the society's moral concerns about sexual integrity and normative judgments about sexual
relations in general. In addition, an analysis of "defenses" requires clear articulation
of various kinds of moral concerns. See note 50 infra.
19. Palmer, A Model o/ Criminal Dispositions, supra note l, at 5.
20. The present constitutional limitations on dispositions have involved two major areas. First, there are limitations on the imposition of the death penalty. See, e.g.,
Coker v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 815 (1977); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Second, there are lesser known constitutional limitations on the use of civil dispositions.
See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (right to liberty); McNeil v.
Director, Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S. 245 (1972) (due process); Jackson v. Indiana, 406
U.S. 715 (1972) (equal protection and due process); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504
(1972) (equal protection).
21. See, e.g., Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
22. See, e.g., Handerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 (1977); Patterson v.
New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
23. Historically, the substantive structure of the American crime of homicide and
the methods of imposing the death penalty have been related. The development of
degrees of murder in America was related to an attempt to avoid the death penalty for
some offenders. See, e.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971) (discussing
the relationship of the death penalty to the substantive definition of homicide).
24. This view also represents one interpretation of the promulgation function of
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A fourth and final assumption about the American criminal
law is that appellate courts, rather than legislatures, should perform the interest analysis underlying rulemaking for disposition.
Traditionally, these courts have assumed the forefront in analyzing particular social control practices. For example, the appellate
courts were the first to question the operation of civil commitment
statutes 25 and to conform the operation of this alternative social
control method to some principles oflegality. One need not argue
that the legislature has no voice in dispositional decision making.
Rather, the position taken here is that the appellate courts should
articulate the social interest to be served in dispositional rule making and that the legislatures should enact dispositional methods
that best serve those identified interests. 26
The proponents of mandatory sentencing ignore the role of
the courts for two reasons. First, they assume that the dispositional issues can be separated from the basic policy questions that
underlie the criminal law; however, the assertion here is that dispositional and substantive policy decisions are interrelated. Second, the proponents of mandatory sentencing fail to recognize
fully all the ramifications of the various methods of social control.
Understanding these ramifications will require a full exegesis of
the role of legislatures and appellate courts in modern criminal
law decision making. The contention of this Article is that courts
. have been making policy choices in the course of administering
.the criminal law and will continue to do so under newly enacted
mandatory schemes. Further, the failure to consider the proper
role of courts in dispositional decision making has obscured the
policy choices that must be made in adopting or rejecting legislatively mandated sentencing.
C.

The Alternative Analysis o/ Mandatory Sentencing Schemes
Part II of this Article uses an interest analysis to critique

the American criminal law. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. DERSHOWITZ & R. SCHWARTZ,
CRIMINAL LAW: THEORY AND PROCESS 251-1224 (1974).
25. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); McNeil v. Director, Patuxent lnst., 407 U.S. 245 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Humphrey v.
Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972).
26. Where the limited utility of criminal dispositions for some purposes has been
recognized and alternative civil forms have been made available, the legislature's major function is to choose the method of social control. For instance, whether the criminal process or the family court ought to be used as a means of social control in
"family assault" cases is a question that a modem legislature is equipped to address
and decide. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT§§ 811-846 (McKinney 1976 & Supp.
1978). The criminal process should not be excluded automatically, rather it must be
consciously chosen over the alternative methods of social control. Once the appellate
court has identified the particular social interests to be served, the legislative choice
can be made more easily and intelligently.
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some specific mandatory sentencing schemes. First, the means by
which an appellate court should approach issues of disposition
under the analysis are summarized. Next, selected legislative enactments imposing mandatory minimum jail terms in the areas of
gun controP 7 and drug abuse are examined. 28 This analysis illustrates the inadequacies of existing theories with respect to the allocation of sentencing authority between appellate courts and
legislatures. In Part III, an examination of one jurisdiction's attempt to impose more certain sentences by eliminating parole 29
demonstrates the proper relationship between courts and the correctional processes. Finally, Part IV analyzes a comprehensive attempt by one legislature to establish fixed or mandated
sentences. 30 This analysis reveals the basic deficiencies in a legislative view of sentencing that does not consider the appellate
court's role in administering dispositional policy.
The current movement to impose legislatively determined
fixed sentences is supported by a growing body of literature. 31
The reform efforts have assumed a utilitarian posture in justifying
a particular form of disposition. Under this view, if rehabilitation
does not work, deterrence or retribution should be the justification
for reform. Adherents of this theory also support the view that the
legislature can resolve all policy issues involved in mandatory sentencing. Those "reformers" who advocate legislatively determined mandatory sentences, however, fail to recognize the crucial
role of the appellate courts in dispositional decision making.
This view bears two defects. First, the reformers' perspective
is functionally simplistic. To justify a recommendation on the
ground that it is "the legislature's function to determine punishment," is to ignore the complexity of the relationship between the
appellate courts and legislatures. Second, this view fails to confront the moral issues raised by viewing the criminal law and its
processes as instruments of social control over the lives of individual members of the community. These reformers have not offered
a method of value analysis for legislative dispositional decision
making. Facing these issues does not lobby either for or against
imposing state control; instead, the intent is to articulate the value
choices incident to the exercise of, or the failure to exercise, a certain form of social control through the criminallaw. 32
27. See notes 51-62 & accompanying text infra.
28. See notes 91-102 & accompanying text infra.
29. See notes 168-80 & accompanying text infra.
30. See notes 212-51 & accompanying text infra.
31. See, e.g., FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT, note 7 supra; DOING JUSTICE,
note 7 supra; J. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME ( 1975).
32. Examining the "reforms" of a modern indeterminate sent.encing scheme will
help to clarify the relevance of the historical origins of the idea of mandatory scntenc-
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The Article concludes by recommending that the call for legislatively mandated sentences be resisted. It is asserted that the
need for more certain sentences will be served better if the interests that underlie the use of criminal sanctions 33 in our modern
legal system are more clearly articulated. This functional approach to the problems of criminal dispositions and to the criminal process generally should lead to the establishment of a more
active policy-making role for appellate courts in dispositional decision making. A mode of analysis that conceives of a more than
nominal role for appellate courts also makes more explicit the
roles of the various other decision makers. In particular, it is argued that the legislature must choose whether to use the criminal
law as an instrument of social control, while it is up to the appellate courts to develop policies for the administration of authorized
criminal dispositions in individual lives. This division of policymaking authority between legislatures and appellate courts is proposed because the use of the criminal law as a means of social
control presents unique kinds of value questions that are best resolved by appellate courts. 34
In one area of deep value conflict, the imposition of a
mandatory death penalty, appellate courts have already begun to
ask fundamental questions about the nature of the dispositional
processes. While this Article does not fully resolve these issues, it
attempts to generate a mode of analysis in which these questions
are made visible and thus amenable to discussion and perhaps
eventual resolution.

11.

LEGISLATIVELY AUTHORIZED MANDATORY SENTENCING:
WHO IS MAKING DISPOSITIONAL POLICY?

Much legislative activity has been devoted to enacting
mandatory sentencing schemes. However, that approach overlooks the crucial role of the appellate courts in dispositional policy
making. In what follows, an "interest analysis" of the appropriate
policy-making role of the appellate courts is discussed. Then, selected legislative enactments are examined in order to illustrate
ing to the current discussion. This Article argues that the task force and the political
ieaders of various persuasions recommending legislatively mandated sentences may
have given new impetus to notions of retribution, ignoring the variety of methods of
social control other than the criminal law available in a modern legal system.
33. "Sanctions," as used· in this Article, "are imposed by the state presumably
against, or at least without regard to, the wishes of the individual being deprived."
Sanctions are thus involuntary in a political, though not necessarily in a psychological
sense. Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low- Visibility
Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 544 n.4 ( 1960).
34. q. Palmer, A Model of Criminal Dispositions, note I supra (discussing the
role of appellate court value analysis in four problem areas of the criminal law).
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the inadequacies of the currently employed division of dispositional authority between the courts and the legislatures.
A.

An Interest Analysis of Dispositional Decision Making

An interest analysis of dispositional decision making requires
an explicit articulation of the interests or values protected by the
criminal law. Five broad categories of values may be posited as a
mode of analysis of the criminal law: 35 human life, integrity of
one's person, private property, "state process," and individual liberty. While the first three values are easily recognizable if one
asks what interests are served by the substantive offenses of murder, assault, and theft, the other two values, "state process" and
individual liberty, require further explication. ·
A criminal offense relates to the state process value when the
determination of criminal liability is based on interferences with
some legislatively imposed system of social control. The category
of offenses can include anything from violation of licensing requirements to noncompliance with regulations regarding food
storage36 or firearm transferY Thus, the value of state process
underlies the host of criminal offenses labelled "public welfare" 38
or "regulatory" offenses. State process crimes differ from crimes
such as murder, assault, or theft where the social control goal is to
regulate directly an actor's conduct towards members of the community. In contrast, when one examines the gun control legislation, which in this analysis is a state process crime, it becomes
evident that state process crimes have distinctive means of determining criminal liability39 that distinguish them from common
law crimes. Although some scholars employ the concepts of
"strict liability" and the "public welfare" when discussing these
problems, 40 the state process category is here employed to illuminate the value choices made in adopting particular standards for
adjudication and disposition. 41
Whether individual liberty is or ought to be a goal of the
criminal law has sparked considerable debate. 42 Individual lib35. Alternatively, it might be said that the criminal law protects three broad interests-security of person, private property, and public welfare. Kadish, The Crisis of
Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS 157, 158 (1967).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
37. See, e.g., United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1970).
38. See generally Sayre, Public We(fare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 55 (1933).
39. See text accompanying notes 97-102 infra.
40. See Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REV. 731
(1960).
41. See Palmer, A Model of Criminal Dispositions, note I supra (discussing examples of how the state process value can be used).
42. See H. PACKER, supra note 13, at 14-16. Professor Packer recognizes that a
concept of individual liberty or autonomy ought to qualify the interest of the criminal
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erty is adopted here as an interest or value of equal weight for
four reasons. First, viewing individual liberty as a goal "serves to
integrate the substance and process of modern criminal law." 43
That is, the judicially fashioned due process limitations are
thereby integrated into the overall interest analysis of criminal law
decision making. 44 Second, the criticisms directed at judges, legislatures and other officials who give too little or too much weight to
individual liberty in their decision making can be made more explicit.45 Third, the individual liberty value performs particular
functions when an interest analysis is applied to dispositional policy making. Because individual liberty is necessarily affected by
any state sanction, the use of any disposition to achieve particular
social control goals must be justified in terms of the values
served. 46 In addition, the concept of liberty helps one to understand why individuals who are subject to dispositions are entitled
to certain allocations of dispositional authority. 47 Finally, where
the social control goals of the criminal law are in doubt, a focus on
the value of individual liberty is a good starting point for developing dispositional rules. In other words, by employing the individual liberty interest, it is possible to examine the range of policy
choices that exist with respect to the substance of criminal sanctions as well as the policy choices presented in sentencing for particular offenses.
The analysis could include more categories or subcategories
if, for example, the interests underlying the offense of rape were
law in crime prevention, but he does not place individual liberty on an equal footing
with "the prevention of crime ... the primary purpose of the criminal law." .Id. at
16.
One of Packer's most outspoken antagonists suggests that the minimizing of state
interference with an individual's life ought to be viewed as one of the primary goals of
criminal law. Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or a Third "Model" if the
Criminal Process, 79 YALE L.J. 359,367 n.34, 374-75 (1970).
43. See Palmer, A Model o/ Criminal Dispositions, supra note I, at 9.
44. At one level, these constitutional limitations on both criminal law adjudication and disposition are essentially new ways in which individuals who are potentially
subject to the criminal process can force the legal system to respond to their challenges. Prior to the criminal law's "constitutionalization," the broad "principle of
legality" was a means of recognizing the individual's need to challenge the legality of
state control. Whether or not one agrees with what the courts have done to modern
criminal law, it should be acknowledged that to include the concept of individual
liberty as an interest of equal importance makes more explicit the way in which individual interests ought to be recognized within the criminal process. See Palmer, A
Model o/ Criminal Dispositions, supra note I, at 10.
45. See notes 187-203 & accompanying text infra.
46. However, the interest of individual liberty as used in dispositional decision
making is not synonymous with freedom from governmental interference. Still, to
recognize individual liberty would allow the state to interfere with an individual labeled "criminal" only to the extent necessary to achieve social control goals.
47. That is, the individual has a "right" to have the courts, rather than legislatures and correctional officials deciding some dispositional policy issues.
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considered. 48 Using only the five categories proposed here, rape
involves the interest of bodily integrity. A full analysis would require that one consider whether the value of sexual integrity is
part of the broader value of bodily integrity or a separate value
promoted in unique ways by the criminallaw. 49 However one answers this question, he should be conscious that any categorization
of values is a heuristic device that will not serve all purposes. 50
The five categories of values proposed, however, are sufficient for
the purpose of establishing a method of rule making for disposition.

B.

Gun Control in Massachusetts: The General Preventive
Function of the Criminal Law

A much publicized Massachusetts statute requires a
mandatory one year term of incarceration upon conviction for unlicensed gun possession. 51 The highest court in Massachusetts has
recently upheld the statutory scheme against several constitutional
attacks. 52 The court rejected the defendant's contentions that the
statute imposed cruel and unusual punishment, 53 violated the
state separation of powers provisions by infringing on judicial discretion, 54 and denied the defendant the equal protection of the
laws under the United States Constitution. 5 5 The court avoided
any discussion of the wisdom or efficacy of the particular scheme
or of the general debate on mandatory sentencing56 and declared
its institutional incompetence to consider any policy argument
about what amount of flexibility in the legal system best serves the
needs of the citizenry. Those policy choices were deemed more
properly within the province of the legislatureY The court's re48. Several state legislatures have recently recharacterized forcible rape as
merely one type of criminal assault. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (West 1976);
MoNT. REv. CoDES ANN.§ 94-5-503 (Supp. 1977) (criminal sexual assault; but same
penalties as assault); N.D. CENT. CoDE§ 12.1-20-03 (Supp. 1977).
49. Deciding whether to change the law of rape to some form of sexual assault
would require this type of analysis.
50. For instance, a different type of value analysis should be developed with respect to the functions of a "defense" such as self-defense. Cf. Goldstein & Katz,
Abolish the "Insanity Difense''-Why Not?, 71 YALE L.J. 853, 856-57 (1963) (suggesting that if a person is allowed to stand his ground and kill in self-defense the law
is subordinating the value of human life to the value of being free of the feelings of
cowardice).
51. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 140, § 131 & ch. 269, § 10 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp.
1978).
52. Commonwealth v. McQuoid, 344 N.E.2d 179 (Mass. 1976); Commonwealth
v. Jackson, 344 N.E.2d 166 (Mass. 1976).
53. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 344 N.E.2d 166, 170-74 (Mass. 1976).
54. /d. at 176-79.
55. Commonwealth v. McQuoid, 344 N.E.2d 179, 180-81 (Mass. 1976).
56. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 344 N.E.2d 166, 169 (Mass. 1976).
57. /d. at 169-70.
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sponse is in accord with existing analyses of sentencing issues.
An interest analysis of the problem before the Massachusetts
court reveals two aspects of its dispositional decision that are sub-merged in existing analysis. First, existing analysis does not view
the legislature's promulgation of the offense as part of an overall
gun control system that relies heavily on police and administrative
decision making for its operation. The record in the Massachusetts case illustrates that courts are asked to review not only the
decision of the legislature, but the decisions of police and administrative officials as well. The "agreed statement of facts" necessary
to the court's holding reveals that two police officers observed the
defendant and his companion in "suspicious circumstances." The
officer discovered a gun in the defendant's possession after apprehending him and a companion. The defendant admitted that he
had neither a license for the weapon nor proper identification as
required by statute. 58 Thus, the most accurate technical descrip··
tion of the defendant's offense was carrying a gun without legal
authorization. 59
Second, the court failed to acknowledge the competition between the values of individual liberty and state process. Were a
court to review only the police encounter with the accused, it
might have assessed the significant impact of this system of social
control upon the value of individual liberty.
Under the proposed analysis, it is apparent that the legislature had made policy choices about the means of social control
long before the addition of a mandatory jail term to the statute.
First, the legislature chose to delegate its authority to a licensing
agency rather than to prohibit completely the carrying of guns by
the civilian population. 60 Such a delegation to an administrative
agency constitutes a determination that it is in the community's
interest to allow some private individuals to have guns. Second, a
system of regulation, rather than a prohibition of all civilian gun
use through the criminal law, might have been relied upon as the
primary means of social control. The theory behind such regulation would be that qualifying the user of guns prevents conduct
harmful to the community and thereby serves the public interest.
If the licensing procedures were minimal, nearly every gun owner
could be expected to comply. Obtaining a gun license would be
similar to obtaining a driver's license. However, even with the licensing of drivers, it should be noted that the legislature has found
58. ld. at 169.
59. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 269, § 10 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1979).
60. q. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149-51 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that a legislature has extremely broad discretion in enacting gun control
measures).

1979]

MANDATORY SENTE'NCING SCHEMES

765

it necessary to authorize penalties for those individuals who fail to
register and obtain a license.
Were the legislature to use the driver licensing system as a
model in establishing a gun licensing system, the role of the police
in apprehending violators would be minimal. The police are central to the administration of this particular state process crime,
however, because of the purpose underlying the statute. While the
licensing systems for both guns and drivers protect the "public
safety," the licensing of guns relates directly to the prevention of
crime. The "unlicensed gun," it is posited, is likely to be used by a
person in a robbery, assault or murder. Thus, the modern legislature and society in general rely upon the police as an official instrument of crime prevention. The apprehension of one
unlicensed gun owner is deemed a general crime prevention measure.
In reviewing the mandatory jail term, the appellate court
should have articulated the underlying legislative theory of
preventing crimes and the role that police perform in the legislative system of social control. Viewing disposition functionally, the
appellate court could have demonstrated that judicial review of
police conduct under these types of statutes should perform two
functions. First, a reviewing court should articulate the particular
prevention function of police in accordance with a general theory
of crime prevention. 61 Second, the court should specify the role it
performs when the general prevention function is made explicit in
the legislative promulgation of offenses.
In the United States Supreme Court's opinions on the "stop
and frisk" situation, 62 the Court discussed the role of police in
administering a gun control statute. The Court did not, however,
analyze the cases before it in terms of dispositional roles and did
not engage in an explicit value analysis as proposed here. An
analysis of these cases in these terms demonstrates how dispositional decision making authority might be allocated among the
police, legislature, and appellate courts. In what follows, an examination of these cases will illustrate how the proposed analysis
integrates constitutional development into overall policy analysis
for the criminal law.
l.

The Crime Prevention Function of the Police
In the first "stop and frisk" case, Terry v. Ohio, 63 the Supreme

61. See generally Andenaes, General Prevention-Illusion or Reality?, 43 J. CRIM.
L.C.&P.S. 176 (1953).
62. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40
(1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968).
63. 392 U.S. I (1968).
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Court upheld the admission of a gun as evidence in Terry's trial
for carrying a concealed weapon. In approving the officer's decision to take the gun from Terry's person, the opinion relied heavily upon a detailed analysis of the arresting officer's words and
actions with respect to Terry and his companions.
The arresting officer, a plainsclothes detective, observed
Terry and two others walking back and forth in front of a jewelry
store. The officer testified that after some period of observation,
he suspected that the trio were about to rob the jewelry store. The
officer approached the suspected robbers and, after a mumbled
exchange of words, frisked all three men for weapons. Since the
frisk indicated the presence of hard items beneath the outer clothing of Terry and one of his companions, Chilton, the officer
searched them for weapons. The third person, Katz, was frisked
but not searched because there was no indication of a weapon after the frisk. The officer took the guns from Terry and Chilton
and arrested the trio. Later, both Terry and Chilton were charged
with and convicted of carrying a concealed weapon. Upon denial
of the suppression motion, the case was appealed to the Supreme
Court. 64
For Chief Justice Warren, the author of the Terry opinion, a
decision on the suppression motion was the analytical starting
point for a judicial resolution of the conflict between the citizen's
right to be free from police intrusion and the necessity that the
police have decision-making authority to prevent crime. 65 The
first prong of his analysis required that the officer have a "reasonably articulable suspicion" that a robbery was about to occur
before stopping the person. 66 In Terry, the police officer's conduct
met this test because the actions of Terry and his companions
would lead "a reasonably prudent" police officer to conclude that
a robbery was about to occur. 67 The second prong of the analysis
required the Court to assess the reasonableness of the scope of the
search. That the officer did not search Katz, the third member of
the trio, indicated that the officer went no further than necessary
to prevent the robbery and to protect himself from the potentially
dangerous weapons.6s
64. /d. at 4-5.
65. /d. at 23-27.
66. /d. at 20-21.
67. Possession of a firearm is one indication that a person may be contemplating
a robbery. Under Chief Justice Warren's analysis, the officer had a duty to prevent
the robbery. /d. at 23.
68. /d. at 29-30. This after-the-fact review of what the police officer saw and did
under the rubric of "reasonableness" bears a close resemblance to the way in which
the judiciary views the significance of events in common law adjudication. See Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Noles on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973). See also Palmer, Advocacy, note 13 supra.
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When the decision in Terry is viewed functionally, two other
aspects of the decision not mentioned by Warren become apparent.69 First, the Ohio statute with respect to carrying a concealed
weapon 70 serves the same underlying crime prevention purpose as
the Massachusetts prohibition against carrying an unlicensed
weapon. The Ohio statute does not include a regulatory licensing
requirement and thus constitutes a direct legislative delegation of
a crime prevention role to the police. The officer's decision in
Terry to place under state control a person about to commit a
robbery was consistent with the legislative purpose.
Second, the decision on the suppression motion in Terry is
equivalent to an adjudication of guilt on the specific charge of carrying a concealed weapon. Hence, approving the arresting officer's conduct in the course of adjudicating Terry's criminal
liability is an implicit delegation of a dispositional function to the
police. That is, the Court's approval of the officer's ·decision and
conduct is ultimately determinative of whether Terry is subject to
state control. 71 The result in Terry allows the police to exercise
direct control over individuals to prevent an identifiable community harm such as robbery. However, Warren's failure to acknowledge this dispositional function of the police and to
articulate the values served thereby has caused his Terry analysis
to engender great confusion.
Five years later, in Adams v. Williams, 72 Justice Rehnquist
used Warren's stop and frisk analysis to validate a police search of
a suspect in his car. The patrolman in Adams approached the defendant's car after being told only minutes beforehand by an unidentified informant that the defendant had both a gun and
narcotics in his possession. Justice Rehnquist reasoned that when
69. Admission of the weapon on the charge of carrying a concealed weapon concluded the issue of Terry's guilt. For possession crimes at least, Judge Cardozo's admonition that "the criminal goes free because the constable has blundered" is true.
People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 582 (1926). To approve the arresting officer's conduct in the course of adjudicating Terry's liability for carrying a concealed
weapon was also to approve the legislature's delegation of a crime prevention function to the police. Since the legislature and the judiciary view the gun as necessary
evidence, it is necessary that there be a prior police-accused encounter every time this
particular offense is adjudicated. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U$. 479, 499
( 1965) (Harlan, J ., concurring).
70. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.12 (Baldwin 1978).
71. Were there no statute prohibiting the carrying of a concealed weapon, the
officer's conclusion that Terry and his companions were "criminals" might have been
based on a charge of attempted robbery. Even though the charge of "attempted robbery" serves a prevention function, the evidentiary problems of determining Terry's
"intent" under such a charge would have been considerable. While determining
standards for "intent" in an attempted robbery charge is one way of protecting individual interests in the criminal process, an analysis of the actual conduct of the official
doing the prevention, the police officer, is a preferable technique.
72. 407 u.s. 143 (1972).
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the defendant rolled down the window instead of complying with
the patrolman's request that he step outside of his car, the patrolman was justified in sea,rching for a gun. And since the defendant
carried the gun precisely where the informant had said it would
be, the scope of the search was reasonable. 73
Justice Rehnquist's interpretation of Warren's Terry opinion
to mean that an officer should prevent any crime represents a significant shift in judicial analytical emphasis. The focus of the
Rehnquist analysis is the dangerousness of the criminal rather
than the conduct of the officer. 74 Under this view, since the perceived purpose of Terry was to insure police safety, an officer
would always be justified in disarming a person he deemed dangerous. The function of the judiciary is thus to allow the police to
perform a self-defined crime prevention role. No attempt is made
to resolve the conflict between the values of liberty and state proc·ess raised by the citizen-police encounter since the defendant's ar·rest is functionally a "conviction."
Despite its shift in focus from the officer's conduct to the dangerousness of the individual, Rehnquist's analysis is similar to
Warren's analysis in one important respect: both Rehnquist and
Warren see the issue of crime prevention two dimensionally as an
allocation of decision-making authority between the appellate
courts and the police. In similar fashion, recent treatment of the
crime prevention function of the police under gun control statutes
has avoided a full analysis of the problem. Such an analysis
should be "tripartite." That is, the appellate court would define
not only its role and the role of the police, but also that of the
legislature. 7 5
2.

The Legislature's Role in Crime Prevention

Warren missed an opportunity to develop a tripartite analysis
of the stop and frisk problem in the companion cases to Terry.
For example, in Sibron v. New York, 76 a case involving a search
for illegal narcotics, Warren invalidated the search under the
73. /d. at 148. After the officer found the gun, an arrest for illegal possession of a
gun was legal. The search for the narcotics was then incidental to this lawful arrest
for illegal possession of a gun. /d. at 149.
74. According to Justice Rehnquist, the patrolman, "properly investigating the
activity of a person who was reported to be carrying narcotics and a concealed
weapon and who was sitting alone in a car in a high-crime area at 2:15 in the morning, ... had ample reason to fear for his safety". /d. at 147-48.
75. A full constitutional analysis of this problem in criminal law should address
the allocation of decision-making authority to the courts, the police, and the legislature. q. Palmer, Advocacy, note 13 supra (discussing a constitutional theory that
includes the role of courts and legislatures in formulating regulations for investigation).
76. 392 u.s. 40 (1968).
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Terry analysis but dismissed the issue of the constitutionality of
the New York stop and frisk law as "abstract and unproductive"
even though the litigants had briefed and argued the point. 77 The
first section of the underlying statute provided procedural standards for police conduct. 78 The second portion defined the circumstances under which an officer could search a person for a
weapon, and when the officer could seize the weapon. 79 Why a
decision about this legislative enactment is "unproductive" in
light of the significance of the legislation to the police crime prevention function is not made apparent. The assertion here is that
Warren's failure to address the issue is based on his original formulation of the issues as two dimensional in Terry.
Warren's analysis in Terry did not consider the role of legislative decision making. In other words, because for Warren the
problem was solely a matter of allocating decision-making authority between judges and police, a perception of any role for legislative decision making in Sibron was impossible. Had Warren
asked what role the legislature grants to police in the administration of drug offenses, he would have had to decide explicitly
whether his own determination 9f the police function should take
precedence over the legislature's definition. so
In the other companion case to Terry, Peters v. New York, 81
Warren used a search incident to arrest theory to uphold the admission into evidence of burglary tools. He reasoned that the of77. !d. at 59.
78. '1. A police officer may stop any person abroad in a public place
whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about
to commit a felony or any of the offenses specified in section five hundred fifty-two of this chapter, and may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his actions.'
/d. at 43 (quoting N.Y. CODE CRtM. PROC. § 180-a) (current version at N.Y. CRIM.
PRoc. LAW§ 140.50(1) (McKinney Supp. 1978)). Under this section, an officer could
walk up to Sibron and ask him his name, if narcotics possession is a felony.
79. '2. When a police officer has stopped a person for questioning pursuant to this section and reasonably suspects that he is in danger of life
or limb, he may search such person for a weapon or any other thing the
possession of which may constitute a crime, he may take and keep it
until the completion, of the questioning, at which time he shall either
return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest such person.'
/d. at 43-44 (quoting N.Y. CODE CRtM. PROC. § 180-1) (current version at N.Y. CRtM.
PRoc. LAW§ 140.50(2) (McKinney Supp. 1978)).
80: If the goal were to control drugs, perhaps Warren would prefer other methods of police investigation. The more typical methods of drug investigation, the use
of specialized narcotics agents and the recruitment of informants, has certain advantages for the judiciary. As pointed out in Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in
Sibron, the legislature's general grant of authority to the police could be constitutional and at the same time the evidence could be excluded at trial if detention was
not necessary to prevent harm to the community or the police officer. 392 U.S. at 7074 (Harlan, J., concurring).
81. /d. at 40 (Peters and Sibron were decided together in one opinion).

770

UCLA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:753

ficer had probable cause to arrest Peters for attempted burglary
when the tools were seized. In so doing, Warren created a doctrinal absurdity by formulating the nonsensical crime of "attempted
burglary." 82 Under the substantive definition of burglary, "breaking and entering with the intent to commit a felony," burglary is
itself a form of attempt crime. 83 If Warren's formulation of attempted burglary is to be taken seriously, he is saying that the
police officer believed the defendant was attempting to attempt
larceny or some other felony.
A functional analysis of the particular crime involved in Peters avoids the doctrinal absurdity of Warren's analysis. The purpose of a statute prohibiting the possession of burglary tools is to
prevent burglaries. The theoretical justification for controlling the
instrumentalities of burglary is similar to the theoretical justification for controlling guns. Warren's use of a search incident to arrest analysis in Peters does not take account of the different
functions that the police perform under various fourth amendment analyses. 84 When the police are trying to detect a crime already committed, the search incident to arrest doctrine is an
appropriate vehicle for appellate review of police crime detection
activities. Requiring a search warrant prior to search when an arrest is planned is a further limitation upon the crime detection
function of the police. 85 In Terry, Warren for the first time explicitly stated that another judicial doctrine, the reasonable suspicion
test, would be utilized when the police perform a crime prevention
function. The combination of the Terry analysis and the search
incident to arrest analysis is in effect a confusion of two distinct
functions of the police: crime detection and crime prevention. 86
If the role of the police in preventing burglary is accepted, the
particular social control functions of the statute in Peters can be
understood. Under this analysis, the judiciary could conclude that
the legislature expects police officers encountering persons with
82. /d. at 66.
83. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTI, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 426 (1972). But see
Taylor v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. 253, 233 S.W.2d 306 (1950).
84. Justice Harlan's concurrence in Peters is a protest against this doctrinal and
factual analysis. Justice Harlan argued that the "search incident to arrest doctrine,"
was inapplicable to the facts of the case. 392 U.S. at 74 (Harlan, J., concurring). If
the purpose of the Terry analysis is to protect the officer from harm, the search should
have been permitted on the ground that there was evidence to justify the officer's
immediate stop and frisk of the suspect. Under Justice Harlan's analysis, the search
and seizure are justified by the apprehended harm to the officer. There is no separate
analysis of the justification for the arrest as required under Chief Justice Warren's
"search incident to arrest" analysis. 392 U.S. at 77-79 (Harlan, J., concurring).
85. q Chime! v. California, 295 U.S. 752 ( 1969) (warrantless search of suspect's
house held not justified as incident to arrest).
86. See generally Adams v. Williamson, 407 U.S. 143, 153-62 (1972) (Marshall,
J ., dissenting).
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guns or burglary tools to sanction those individuals. As with the
gun control statute, here the judicial standards for reviewing police conduct seek primarily to insure that there is sufficient evidence to justify judicial approval of police conduct in their
performance of the crime prevention function. 87
More generally, Warren's analysis obscures the variable relationship between the police crime prevention function and the
substance of the offense. Although Terry, St'bron, and Peters all
involve defendants found guilty of possession offenses, the role
given police in administering sanctions under each of the statutes
derives from different values. An appellate court reviewing police
conduct under these statutes should acknowledge the distinct legislative purposes in sanctioning the carrying of weapons, the possession of drugs, and the possession of burglary tools. The best
way to see how the crime prevention function of police varies with
the offense is to analyze the three cases in terms of the particular
values upheld by the decisions.
3.

An Interest Analysis of Crime Prevention

The value of individual liberty is at issue in the Peters; Sibron,
and Terry cases since each involves a possession crime. 88 The values of private property and, secondarily, bodily security are promoted by laws prohibiting robbery. Similarly, the value of private
property is protected by a law prohibiting burglary. Control of
the instruments-themselves as a means of protecting private property is legitimate as long as other competing values, individual liberty and bodily security (here, the bodily security of a person who
also happens to perform the function of police officer), 89 are not
compromised excessively.
In effect, were Sibron's adjudication and disposition upheld,
he would be subject to state control solely to uphold the state
process. In contrast, Peters' and Terry's convictions uphold the
values of property and bodily security as well as the value of state
process. Thus, Terry and Peters are two cases in which the appellate court implicity agreed that the appropriate value balance is
87. SeeM. KADISH & S. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY 37-94 (1973) (examining the use of roles in analyzing problems of discretion).
88. See, e.g., Allen v. County Court, Ulster County, 568 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1977)
(holding facially unconstitutional a New York statute stating that the presence of a
gun in a car constitutes presumptive evidence of its possession by the car's occupants),
cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 75 ( 1978).
89. Notice that here one is not confronted with a situation in which an "innocent" civilian is carrying a gun in Massachusetts for "self-protection" and police arrest discretion is used to avoid bringing this "innocent" person into the process. See
Beha, "And Nobody Can Get You Out':· The Impact of a Mandatory Prison Sentence
for the Illegal Carrying of a Firearm on the Use of Firearms and on the Administration
if Criminal Justice in Boston (pt. 2), 57 B.U.L. REV. 289, 299-300 (1977).
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maintained under the legislatively authorized method of social
control-prohibiting possession of the instrumentalities of crime.
For a court to determine what balance is appropriate is to assume
a policy-making role. Thus, to inquire whether the Terry analysis
is to be applied to mere possession offenses is to ask whether the
judiciary should limit the legislature's ability to delegate a crime
prevention function to the police. 90
Under existing stop and frisk case law, there are essentially
two ways of viewing the crime prevention function of the police.
Under the view espoused by Mr. Justice Warren, the crime prevention function of the police is limited by the judiciary's implicit
definition of the types of societal harm that justify police intrusions upon individual liberty. The results in Terry, St'bron, and
Peters indicate that the types of harms police can prevent are
closely related to common law crimes. Police intrusions to prevent a robbery or burglary were consistent with their crime prevention duty under Terry and Peters, but an effort to prevent drug
possession was viewed as inconsistent with that duty in Sibron.
Narrowly defining "harm" in terms of common-law crimes allows
the judiciary to evaluate an officer's testimony under the judicial
standards of proof of common law crimes. The purpose of the
evaluation is to determine whether there indeed exists the feared
societal harm. While possession crimes underlay the convictions
in Peters and Terry, the real purpose of the approved police conduct was the prevention of a particular robbery or burglary. The
judicial role under this view is to provide guidelines on a case-bycase basis that confine the police crime prevention function within
a common law based definition of harm. By so doing, the judiciary is evaluating and defining the dispositional role of the police.
On the other hand, Mr. Justice Rehnquist sees the crime prevention function of the police essentially as one of controlling
dangerous persons. Under this view, the judiciary is more concerned with ascertaining whether there is sufficient evidence of individual dangerousness than with regulating police conduct.
Thus, the modern police force has the authority to control dangerous individuals unless, while obtaining custody of the individual,
there is a violation of some previously promulgated procedural
rule.
The assertion here is that a recognition of the crime prevention function of the police requires the judiciary to establish a gen90. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan quoted Judge Friendly's dissent in the Court of Appeals below: "I have the
gravest hesitancy in extending (Terry v. Ohto) to crimes like the possession of narcotics . . . . There is too much danger that, instead of the stop being the object and the
protective frisk an incident thereto, the reverse will be true." 407 U.S. at 151.
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eral dispositional theory. Such a theory should first articulate the
legislative role in creating the police crime prevention function.
As suggested above, the legislative promulgation of the prohibitions against the possession of certain items or instrumentalities
implicitly creates a police crime prevention function. Then, in
monitoring the operation of these legislative crime prevention
measures, the judiciary must choose a theory of prevention. The
position taken in this Article is that the judiciary should choose an
approach that seeks to limit the crime prevention role of the police. Such an approach would preserve existing case law that
seeks to insure the safety of the police officer, but would be critical
of cases that allow the police too broad a crime prevention role.
This analysis would recognize that the initial police-citizen encounter under a gun control statute is at least as significant, in
terms of dispositional consequences, as the sanction imposed after
formal adjudication. A better method of judicial analysis would
acknowledge the interrelationship among the methods of crime
prevention, adjudication, and disposition in gun control legislation.
C.

Drug Use and Abuse: The Criminal and Civil Law as Means
of Crime Prevention

In a series of controversial modifications of its penal and correctional laws, the New York Legislature established mandatory
sentences for drug trafficking. The legislators first reclassified the
offenses prohibiting the selling or possession of certain amounts of
drugs, such as heroin and cocaine. As a result of this reclassification, illegal drug possession and selling were crimes with long
mandatory minimum periods of confinement. 91 In addition, narcotics offenses could not be reduced by the process of plea negotiation.92 Lastly, narcotics offenders became ineligible for
unconditional discharge from their sentences. 93 A narcotics offender released prior to the end of his prison term was subject to
parole supervision for the remainder of his life.
These legislative reforms, collectively known as the "Rockefeller Drug Law," were recently sustained by New York's highest
court. 94 In an opinion consolidating the appeal of eight different
cases, the court rejected the claim that the sentences were "grossly
disproportionate" when compared with sentences imposed for
91. The impact of New York's Drug Law is analyzed in NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE NATION'S TOUGHEST DRUG LAW:
EVALUATING THE NEW YORK EXPERIENCE, fiNAL REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON NEW YORK DRUG LAW EVALUATION 3-6 (1978).
92. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 220.10 (McKinney Supp. 1978).
93. N.Y. CoRREC. LAw§ 212(8) (Consol. 1977) (repealed 1977).
94. People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100,332 N.E.2d 338,371 N.Y.S.2d 471 (1975).
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other offenses. 95 The court acknowledged that the wisdom of the
legislative decisions to increase the gravity of drug offenses and
reduce discretionary decision making in handling narcotics offenders was highly debatable. Like the Massachusetts court, however, the New York court saw its role as requiring it to accept the
legislature's conclusions about the gravity of the offenses and the
penological purposes served by the reforms. The court felt compelled to hold that subjecting drug sellers and possessors to penalties commensurate with those imposed for murder, kidnapping,
and arson was "reasonable" and thus constitutional. 96
The court justified its decision by relying on legislative reports that supported the proposition that drug penalties prevent
collateral crimes such as robberies and burglaries. 97 The more
general crime prevention purpose attributed to legislatively determined drug offenses, however, is a mere label that hinders a full
analysis of the competing interests. The court should have used
an interest analysis to articulate what particular values are served
by these statutes before concurring in the legislative judgment
about the similarity of murder to the drug offenses.
Making murder a crime upholds the value of human life; and
creating penalties for kidnapping and arson upholds the values of
bodily integrity and private property. 98 Promulgating the drug offenses might be thought to uphold the value of health; but as
structured, these criminal offenses protect the value of state process.99 The New York court assumed that all three values are
treated similarly by the criminal law. However, the contention
here is that the criminal law does not and ought not treat these
values in the same fashion. 100 The court should have analyzed the
complex manner in which these drug offenses-"controlled substances offenses"-protect the state process and health values.
In order to perform an interest analysis of drug offenses, a
court would have to examine the variety of ways in which the legal system deals with drugs. For example, an individual may ob-·
95. /d. at 110, 332 N.E.2d at 341, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 475. See also Carmona v.
Ward, 576 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that mandatory sentences of life imprisonment imposed on defendants under the Rockefeller Drug Law were not so grossly
disproportionate to the nature of their offenses as to constitute cruel and unusual
punishment), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 874 ( 1979).
96. People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 115-18, 332 N.E.2d 338, 344-46, 371
N.Y.S.2d 471. 479-81 (1975).
97. !d. at 113, 332 N.E.2d at 343, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 477.
98. C.f. id. at 115-17, 332 N.E.2d at 344-46, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 479-81 (comparing
the punishment for drug offenses with the punishment for other felonies).
99. See, e.g., New York Controlled Substances Act, N.Y. Pus. HEALTH LAW
§§ 3300-3397 (McKinney 1977). Section 3301(a) provides that "this article shall govern and control the possession, manufacture, dispensing, administering, and distribution of controlled substances . . . . "
100. See notes 102-40 & accompanying text in.fra.
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tain a drug at the supermarket to relieve his self-diagnosed
ailment without direct interference from the legal system. In contrast, an "addict" may be subject to involuntary civil commitment
to cure him of his "affliction." A complex system of state and federal regulations is designed to assure the patient's access to necessary drugs, yet the use and the distribution of drugs outside this
regulatory scheme are crimes. 101
The New York court's analysis thus fails to acknowledge that
a criminal disposition is only one of a variety of means of controlling drugs in our society. Furthermore, the court's analysis does
not take account of the growing controversy with respect to both
the practice of regulating drugs to promote health and the effects
of using the criminal law to control drug use. 102 Before concurring in a legislative judgment that a mandatory sentence for drug
trafficking prevents collateral crimes, a court should analyze its
role in allocating the prevention function within the legal system:
it should articulate the precise role of the criminal law in this varied system of control over drug use. Such an endeavor would
require an analysis of the adjudicative and dispositive processes in
the area of drug abuse.
1.

Criminal Liability for Drug Abuse: A Medical Model of
Social Control
In Robinson v. Ca!!fornia, 103 for the first time, the Supreme
Court addressed the application of the eighth amendment to the
problem of drug abuse control statutes. An analysis of Robinson
illustrates how medical knowledge and perspectives can shape legal approaches to the imposition of social control over drug abuse.
In holding that it is unconstitutional to inflict "punishment" on a
person afflicted with the "illness" of narcotic addiction, the Court
initiated a full-fledged debate about the social control role of the
criminal law over drug-related offenses. That debate involves various perspectives on the proper relationship of criminal liability
for drug offenses to the particular form of disposition authorized
for drug abusers.I04
Two points about Robinson are essential for a full under101. Thus the statute specifically upholds the value of "state process"-the administrative process of regulating drug use----<iesigned to protect the community's health.
102. See H. PACKER, note 13 supra. Moreover, many state legislatures recently
have reduced certain drug related penalties in an attempt to decriminalize some drug
offenses. See, e.g., New York Marijuana Reform Act of 1977, N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 221.05 (McKinney Supp. 1978). See also State v. Ward, 57 N.J. 75, 82-83, 270 A.2d
I, 5 ( 1970) (suggesting that first offenders in marijuana possession cases should receive
suspended sentences).
103: 370 u.s. 660 (1962).
104. The full ramifications of this particular debate for eighth amendment jurisprudence will not be explored here.

776

UCLA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:753

standing of the dispositional policy issues courts must confront in
the drug abuse area. First, the precise holding of Justice Stewart's
opinion in Robinson is unclear and remains the subject of controversy.105 It is difficult to determine whether Stewart meant that
the state could not use the criminal adjudicative process to label
the "sick" addict a criminal or that it could not use a criminal
disposition for the addict. 106 Indeed, Robinson has been used to
stand for both propositions in subsequent cases.
In Powell v. Texas, 107 a case dealing with the nexus of "disease" and criminal liability, Justice Marshall held that a person
afflicted with the disease of "chronic alcoholism" constitutionally
could be convicted of the crime of public drunkenness. For Marshall, Robinson stood only for the proposition that to attach criminality to the mere "status" of being an addict or being sick was
unconstitutional. Hence, it is not cruel and unusual punishment
to hold a person criminally accountable for "voluntarily" going
into a public place while intoxicated. 108 In other words, Robinson
was a constitutional limitation on criminal adjudication rather
than a limitation on disposition. 109 In contrast, Justice Stewart's
use of Robinson in his series of death penalty opinions indicates
that he was in fact concerned about dispositions. 110 Thus, it was
the criminal form of disposition under Stewart's view that was impermissible under the eighth amendment. 111
The second point to be recognized about Robinson is that the
controversy over the holding is a reflection of a larger controversy
about the role of the criminal process in drug abuse generally. In
Robinson, Stewart and other justices disagreed over whether a
"medical model" 112 of control ought to be used for drug abuse.
The Stewart analysis exemplifies the medical model of social con··
trol.
Robinson was decided in an era when the rehabilitative ideal
105. See, e.g., Fingarette, Addiction and Criminal Responsibtlity, 84 YALE L.J. 413
( 1975).
106. See Palmer, A Model of Criminal Dispositions, supra note I, at 8.
107. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
108. /d. at 532-34.
109. Justice White's concurrence in Powell went even further in suggesting that
Robinson was a constitutional limitation on all forms of adjudication. /d. at 548-49.
Although other justices still treat Robinson as a limitation on adjudication, Justice
White's recent death penalty dissents are particularly noteworthy examples of that
view. See, e.g., Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 350-56 (1976) (White, J., dissenting); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,306-07 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
110. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 172 (1976).
Ill. Under such a view of the meaning of the eighth amendment, Justice Stewart's
decision gave constitutional approval to involuntary civil confinement of addicts in a
case in which that issue was not before the court.
112. See text accompanying notes 117-19 infra (defining the medical model).
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dominated scholarly and public discussion of criminal process 113
and of drug abuse in particular. In contrast to the goals of the
present era, reform and rehabilitation of the ordinary criminal offender by experts was thought to be the only justifiable purpose of
imposing state control. 114 Avoiding the stigma and degradation of
jail or prison was the first step in fundamental reform of the entire
criminal process. 115 In this philosophical atmosphere, even one
day in jail for the presumably "sick" addict would be abhorrent.l16
Hence, Stewart's view recognizes the legitimate need for the
control of drug abuse but prefers a medical method of controlling
individuals to a criminal method of control: 117 an involuntary
civil commitment designed to cure the addict of his affliction is
more palatable than a criminal disposition.l 18 Thus, Stewart's
constitutional analysis permitted the legislature to use the criminal
law to impose sanctions on the manufacture, distribution, and
possession of drugs, but not the disease of "addiction." 119
Judges and legislatures have never fully embraced the medical model as the general method of social control for the criminal
law.l 20 However, most legal policy makers acknowledge the importance of medical and scientific decision making in devising a
system of criminal liability for drug abuse. For instance, Justice
Clark's Robinson dissent is based on his disagreement with Justice
Stewart over the proper legal interpretation of the term "addicted"
113. See Allen, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Idea/, in THE BoRDERLAND OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 25 (1964).
114. But see Andenaes, The Genera/ Preventive Effects o/ Punishment, 114 U. P A.
L. REV. 949, 973-74 (1966).
115. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 668 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring). During the course of his opinion, Justice Douglas discusses the changing
methods of dealing with the "insane." !d. at 668-69. He intimates that civil commitment is a preferred method of dealing with "addicts," id. at 677, and rejects criminal
prosecutions for addicts by asserting: "This age of enlightenment cannot tolerate such
a barbarous action," id. at 678.
116. In Robinson, Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, concluded that
a State law which imprisons a person [afflicted with the illness of narcotic addiction], even though he has never touched any narcotic drug
within the State or been guilty of any irregular behavior there, inflicts a
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. To be sure, imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the abstract, a
punishment which is either cruel or unusual. But the question cannot
be considered in the abstract. Even one day in prison would be a cruel
and unusual punishment for a "crime" of having a common cold.
370 U.S. at 667.
117. Seeid. at 668 (Douglas, J., concurring).
118. /d. at 665.
119. /d. at 664-67.
120. See, e.g., lnreFoss, 10 Cal. 3d 910,933-38,519 P.2d 1073, 1088-91, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 649, 663-66 (1972) (Clark, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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in the California Health and Safety Code. 121 Under Clark's interpretation, the defendant Robinson was a "voluntary addict," that
is, a person just starting to use the prohibited drug. When the
person became unable to control his craving for the drug, he became an "involuntary addict" amenable to civil commitment. In
Clark's view there was nothing unconstitutional about using a
ninety day jail term with two years of parole supervision as a
method of controlling a "voluntary" addict. 122
Stewart failed to perceive Clark's distinction because, in
Stewart's view, all addicts are assumed to be physiologically and
thus medically addicted. Even though their discussions of what
the legislature meant by addiction differed, both their analyses require some background scientific knowledge or assumptions about
the effects of particular drugs upon human beings. Determinations of these effects are made by medical investigators and practitioners in our society. Hence, the issue is not, for example,
whether all legal decisions should now be made on the assumption
that newer information relating drug addiction to peer social influence is correct. 123 Rather, when analyzing a problem of criminal liability for drug abuse, the issue is the extent to which
medical or scientific decision making should influence legal decision making.
Were an appellate court to confront the appropriateness of a
"medical model" for determining individual liability for drug use,
it would necessarily consider a series of questions about the social
institutions utilized to facilitate and control drug use. First, the
court would ask itself: in what ways does the law view the medical
process as a system of social control? In formulating an answer,
the court should acknowledge that in some circumstances the law,
or at least judges, have demonstrated a certain ambivalence in
delegating delicate social value judgements to medical professionals.124 Second, and more specifically, in the area of drug use, the
121. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 679-85 (1962) (Clark, J., dissenting)
(discussing former CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE § 11721 (enacted as ch. 1079, 1939
Cal. Stats. 3003)).
122. /d. at 681-84.
123. Subsequent research, for example, has demonstrated that Stewart's assumptions about the physiological basis of heroin addiction were unwarranted. See J.
WILSON, supra note 31, at 128-33.
124. See, e.g., In re Dinnerstein, 380 N.E.2d 134, 134 (Mass. App. 1978) ("[A]
physician attending an incompetent, terminally ill patient may lawfully direct that
resuscitation measures be withheld in the event of cardiac or respiratory arrest where
such a direction has not been approved in advance by a Probate Court"). C.f. In re
Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (court hesitant to
delegate facially similar human value decisions to physicians). "Determinations as to
these must, in the ultimate, be responsive not only to the concepts of medicine but
also to the common moral judgment of the community at large. In the latter respect,
the Court has a non-delegable judicial responsibility." /d. at 44, 355 A.2d at 665.
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court should ask itself: What role does the medical profession play
in preventing drug abuse in the society? In formulating an answer
to that question, a court should note that the legislative method of
controlling drugs is dependent upon doctors' adherence to strict
medical standards when giving drugs to "patients." 125 Thus, the
exercise of medical discretion is generally a key element in the
legislative design of social control systems for drug use.
Drugs have been characterized as the "key to modern
medicine"; 126 and medication is the preferred mode of treatment
for a host of medical problems. Because of this societal esteem,
we often fail to acknowledge that "overruse, abuse and misuse" of
drugs constitute a major health problem in the United States. 127
Ambivalence about the role of medical professions in the social
control of drug use in our society, therefore, is not explicit.
Drugs are thus a mixed blessing in that they are necessary for
modern medical treatment and yet are potentially hazardous.
This mixed blessing aspect is reflected in several ways in our laws
regulating drug use. First, the typical criminal drug statute regulates how the drugs can be dispensed. This regulatory scheme is
designed to insure that patients are able, for instance, to obtain
needed prescription drugs. This facilitates the use of drugs in curing medically defined illnesses. It should be noted, however, that
some drugs, such as heroin, have been legislatively declared to
have no accepted medical use. 128 One might ask for the scientific
or medical justifications for such a classification. The answer
from a scientific point of view is probably "none." However, the
answer in terms of helping society deal with the health threat of
drugs is more complex.
By prohibiting some drugs, society assures itself that health
risks are minimized and medicinal benefits are maintained. This
is not to suggest that the preceding effect follows from eliminating
heroin use in society. Rather, the legislative scheme puts the societal imprimatur on what are the safe as opposed to the unsafe
drugs.
A court analyzing the role of the medical profession under
criminal drug statutes could articulate the values underlying those
The court's ambivalence was expressed in the closing sentence of its opinion: "[W]e
do not intend to be understood as implying that a proceeding for judicial declaratory
relief is necessarily required for the implementation of comparable decisions in the
field of medical practice." /d. at 55, 355 A.2d at 672.
125. A typical drug statute prohibits use unless the drug is administered by a person licensed to do so, such as a physician. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE
§ 11550 (West Supp. 1979).
126. V. fUCHS, WHO SHALL LIVE? HEALTH, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL CHOICE
104 (1975).
127. /d. at 119.
128. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(l)(B) (1976).
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statutes that require proof of drug use without medical or state
administrative approval. In fact, a typical drug abuse statute includes a provision prohibiting use "unless authorized by law" or
"administered by a person licensed by the state. board." 129 Thus,
the statutes as structured uphold the value of the state process.
While it is already the defendant's burden to prove lawful use,
statutes also generally use presumptions to ease both the prosecutor's burden of producing evidence and his burden of persuasion
at trial. 130
A court evaluating the medical model could then address the
legislative schemes mandating involuntary (or voluntary, if that is
truly possible) commitment for certain forms of drug abuse 131 as
part of this system of state regulation. The legislatures sometimes
explicitly allow an individual to be removed from the criminal
process after adjudication and to be placed in the civil process
instead. 132 At other times, before adjudication, judges without
legislative authorization allow individuals to be shifted out of the
criminal process through pretrial diversion. 133
Perceiving the melange of social control mechanisms within
the law, a court could put into perspective the often exaggerated
and confused community responses to drug use and abuse. For
example, the present intellectual atmosphere is one of disillusionment with the prospect of rehabilitating any offender, and particularly drug offenders, through the legal process. Some scholars
now suggest that confronting the public policy issues surrounding
heroin use requires an acknowledgement of the general lack of
understanding of drug abuse in society. 134 In contrast, the political atmosphere that leads legislatures to call drug abuse a "grave
offense" is fed by the image of a drug-driven individual robbing to
obtain money to purchase illegal drugs. The drug-driven robber
is perceived as being more in need of social control than the mere
robber. More social control is thought necessary because the
129. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 11550 (West Supp. 1979).
130. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAw§ 220.25 (McKinney Supp. 1978).
131. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL Hvo. LAw§§ 23.01-.29 (McKinney 1978); N.Y. PENAL LAw§ 60.03 (McKinney 1975).
132. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CoDE§§ 3050-3059 (West 1972 & Supp. 1979);
if. In re De La 0, 59 Cal. 2d 128, 378 P.2d 793, 28 Cal. Rptr. 489 ( 1963) (statute
providing for suspension of criminal proceedings and confinement for treatment of
narcotics addiction held not to impose cruel and unusual punishment and was not
intended to be a penal sanction when enacted by the legislature).
133. See, e.g., State v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85, 363 A.2d 321 (1976); if. People v.
Reed, 112 Cal. Rptr. 493 (2d Dist. 1974), vacated, 46 Cal. App. 3d 625, 120 Cal. Rptr.
250 (2d Dist. 1975) (post-trial diversion by trial judge; later vacated because statute
only allowed diversion prior to trial).
134. See generally J. WILSON, supra note 31, at 125-59.
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drug-driven robber has acted in contradiction to two social control
systems, the legal and the medical.
Additionally it would be recognized that the social control
potential of medical programs, such as methodone maintenance,
has been exaggerated. Having given the "patient-robber" a new
drug, "methadone," policy makers are discovering that he has not
been "cured" of his propensity to rob. 135 Under these circumstances, a court should point out that the medical model's image
of a drug-driven robber reflects conflicting goals. Unfortunately,
the need to "help and cure" the patient-criminal obscures the additional need that he be controlled and punished. 136
A legislature might attempt to implement the previous analysis and clarify the social control goals by redefining statutory
crimes. For example, a legislature could provide that anyone
found under the influence of an illicit drug when committing robbery would receive a mandatory sentence. Instead of a statute authorizing judges to order a medical examination to determine the
defendant's need for care and custody, 137 a different kind of statutory provision would be needed. Such a statute would require a
medical examination of the accused prior to trial to see if the prosecutor has sufficient evidence to elevate the charge of robbery to
"drug-related robbery."I3s
Note, however, that even to state the bare outline of the statutory scheme raises a constitutional question. The accused robber's
right not to be used as a source of evidence in the adjudication of
his guilt is possibly violated by the proposed statute. One purpose
of the statute might be to allow the prosecutor to meet his burden
of proof at adjudication.l 39 Were the proposed statut~ enacted,
society would be left with the choice of either modifying 'standards
of proof when scientific evidence is used to define substantive
crimes or compelling the accused to be used as a source of evidence.
In raising the constitutional question, one merely adopts the
135. Jd. at 154.
136. Cf Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the Insanity Difense-Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J.
853, 868-70 (1963) (noting that desires for retribution against the "sick" law-breaker
are masked by more socially acceptable ideas favoring "treating the sick").
137. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL Hva. LAW§§ 23.07, .09 (McKinney 1978).
138. Some legislatures have authorized mandatory sentences if an offense is committed with a firearm. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§§ 53a-35(c)(2),-134 (West
Supp. 1978). The proposed drug related robbery statute builds upon this legislative
model.
139. To meet the constitutional standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, see
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), a legislature would have to authorize the
admission of the evidence obtained in the mandated examination.
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existing perspective of appellate courts on the social control poli··
cies proposed. In adopting this perspective, one should be aware
that society is not prepared to make determinative policy choices.
The social utility of drugs may well be increasing-that is, congru ..
ent with notions of how to promote "health" as a value, society
may need more drugs, not less. The "drug-related robbery" statute would make the ambivalence about the social utility of drug
use more visible.
For good reasons, society has not formally altered its basic
methods of adjudicating and disposing of drug offenders. First, to
adopt the proposed statute allowing preadjudicative examination
of the offender would require one to treat the medical knowledge
that is the foundation of the statutory scheme as if it were fundamentally valid and indisputable. Although this conforms to the
lay view of medical science, medical knowledge is derived from a
process of clinical experience and reasoning that is essentially dynamic. A particular drug is an appropriate treatment because of
clinical tests demonstrating its effectiveness. Subsequent tests may
indicate that its side effects are so serious that the drug should no
longer be prescribed. 140 To base the entire criminal process for
drug abusers on a premise which is as dynamic as medical knowledge would make the criminal process appear uncertain and transient. In particular, if the presumed causal relationship between
crime and drugs is disproved, or at least recognized to change over
time with further research and clinical experience, the justification
for employing criminal means to regulate drug abuse would be
open to serious doubt.
Second, and more importantly, ignoring doubts about the nature of criminal liability for drug offenses allows existing invisible
methods of control to operate without question. The present drug
control system is at variance with the basic principle of criminal
law that courts are the primary arbiters of criminal liability. An
ambivalence about the appropriate methods for controlling drugs
has led to a shift in decision making authority from courts to other
officials; and prosecutors have been the primary recipients of this
redistribution of authority.
140. The recent controversy over diethylstilbestrol (DES) illustrates the point.
DES is a man-made estrogen that has many medical uses. For a period of 25 years
DES was prescribed to prevent miscarriages in pregnant women. Subsequent research, however, indicated that use of DES during pregnancy increased the risk of
cancer in the user's daughters. As a result, in 1971, the Food and Drug Administration banned the use of DES for pregnant women. See Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory o.f Enterprise Liabilit.)', 46 FoRDHAM L. REv. 963 (1978) (discussing
some of the legal issues surrounding DES).
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Prosecutors as Social Control Agents: An Inquisitorial
Theme in the American Criminal Process 141

In theory, the American prosecutor's obligation is to present
vigorously the community's case against its adversary, the criminal defendant in an accusatory criminal process. Since the prosecutor is elected for a short term, the local community, or "client,"
can "fire" him through the electoral process whenever his performance is deemed unsatisfactory. The American prosecutor,
then, is generally a practicing lawyer serving as the community's
advocate. 142
In contrast, the typical European prosecutor is an appointed
or career official having closer ties with the courts and the central
government in what may be called an inquisitorial criminal process.143 The Continental prosecutor's role is to pursue the "public
interest," and not simply to represent the community in a lawsuit.
As an arm of the court and central government, he is not even
considered a member of the practicing bar. 144 As a public servant,
the inquisitorial prosecutor takes an active part in the investiga141. The subtitle for this section is taken from Goldstein, Rtjlections on Two
Models: Inquisitorial Themes in American Criminal Procedures, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1009
(1974). In the course of developing his basic thesis that the development of American
criminal procedure has been influenced by concepts and practices from the European
inquisitorial systems of criminal procedures, Professor Goldstein suggests that
regulatory offenses create pressures for inquisitorial procedures. He states:
It was probably inevitable that American criminal procedure
would become less accusatorial as government became more complex
and criminal law was used more often as an instrument of social policy.
Many of the new regulatory offenses could not be enforced if exclusive
reliance were placed, in accordance with accusatorial theory, upon
those who were wronged. In some instances, this is because victims
lack the resources or self-assurance to litigate or because there are not
victims in the usual sense. Such "victimless" crimes include gambling,
narcotics, and sex offenses, where the criminal law has been used to
control conduct engaged in consensually. To enforce this new body of
regulatory criminal laws and to cope with the increase in the older
crimes against property and person as America became more industrial
and urban, police forces grew and prosecuting attorneys expanded their
activities. The criminal sanction became only one among a range of
devices~riminal, administrative, injunctive, and monetary-for
controlling conduct.
/d. at 1021.
While Professor Goldstein does not specifically point to changes in the prosecutor's role as an example of an "inquistorial theme" in American criminal procedure,
see, e.g., id. at 1022-25, I believe the analysis presented in this section is consistent
with his overall analysis.
142. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION 17-19 ( 1970).
143. Even the English Director of Public Prosecutions is a career official and a
subordinate of the cabinet minister. /d. at 17. Thus, the English prosecutor responds
to different institutional forces than does the American prosecutor.
144. For example, the Continental prosecutor would not generally be expected to
participate in a bar association meeting. /d. at 17.
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tion and adjudication of crimes and the disposition of criminals:
both identifying the innocent and seeking punishment for the
guilty.l45
In practice, the American prosecutor plays a dominant role in
all phases of drug enforcement (much like a Continental prosecutor). First, in contrast to their role in other types of offenses, prosecutors supervise the investigative agents involved in drug abuse
detection and control. For example, a prosecutor decides whether
information gathered from an accused drug abuser should be used
to obtain a search warrant against another accused drug abuser. It
is the prosecutor who is required by law to seek judicial authorization for a wire-tap to "break up a drug ring." 146
Besides supervising the investigation of drug offenses, the
American prosecutor has an important policy-making role in deciding who will be adjudged guilty of narcotics crimes. The prosecutor decides how the information gathered by specialized
narcotics agents is to be used; for example, whether the information gathered from informants will be used in the prosecution of a
particular drug trafficker. 147 By law, the prosecutor is required to
decide who among several candidates will be granted immunity in
exchange for testimony against a fellow offender. And, without
explicit legislative authorization, it is the prosecutor who must ap·prove any "plea bargains" arranged by narcotics agents with offenders who desire to become informants.
As far as the ultimate disposition of offenders is concerned, it
is the prosecutor who must decide whether to charge individuals
with offenses carrying mandatory prison sentences. 148 Until quite
recently, prosecutors had complete discretion to refuse an accused
drug offender's request for disposition outside of the criminal
145. In theory, the Continental prosecutor has no discretion not to prosecute for
major crimes. See Jescheck, The Discretionary Power of the Prosecuting Allorney in
West Germany, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 508 (1970). Considerable controversy has developed over whether the Continental prosecutor exercises wider discretion in practice:
than the theory of his role would suggest. Compare Goldstein & Marcus, The Myth of
Judicial Supervision in Three "Inquisitorial" Systems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87
YALE L.J. 240 (1977) (suggesting that empirical studies ofthe three European systems
reveal that prpsecutors have considerably more discretion than many Americans have
been led to believe) with Langbein & Weinreb, Continental Criminal Procedure:
"Myth" and Reality, 87 YALE L.J. 1549 (1978) (disputing the claims of Professor
Goldstein and Mr. Marcus).
146. See, (!.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 700.05(5), .05(8)(c), .10(1) (McKinney
1971 & Supp: 1978).
147. See~. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 136 (1966).
148. See Note, Drug Abuse, Law Abuse, and the Eighth Amendment: New Yorks
1973 Drug Legislation and the Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 60
CORNELL L. REV. 638,662 (1975). See generally 1. SKOLNICK, supra note 147, at 12037.
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process through pre-trial diversion. 149
These discretionary decisions must be made in terms of an
overall assessment of the broader public interest rather than in
terms of the merits of each individual case. Making these assessments also requires some centralization of decision making in
drug law enforcement. Thus, the American prosecutor has become the key arbiter between the accused drug offender and the
state.
The prosecutor's role as arbiter of the public interest is at
odds with other idealized aspects of the criminal process, both accusatorial and adversarial. The trial judge rather than the prosecutor is theoretically the impartial arbiter between the state and
the accused. 150 In fact, the trial judge simply ratifies prosecutorial
decisions as to which drug offender should be subject to particular
investigative, adjudicative, and dispositional measures. In addition, investigative decisions crucial to the accused's fate are made
in ex parte proceedings. By the time the process has reached an
adversarial trial where the accused is represented by counsel, his
fate has usually been determined, absent some "procedural mistake."
Appellate courts have reacted ambivalently to the tension
that exists between the ideology of the accusatory system and
practices that are more akin to an inquisitorial system. Although
the growing complexity of our society has created the need for
regulatory drug laws, as noted above, such laws are in fact also
pressures for new kinds of criminal procedures. 151 Rather than
openly acknowledge the existence of such inquisitorial themes in
American criminal law, appellate courts generally have allowed
the basic tension to remain unresolved.
Appellate courts might help to eliminate this dissonance by
reviewing the social control decisions made in drug prosecutions.
People v. Reed, 152 for instance, illustrates that pre-trial diversion
decisions are dispositional determinations that should not be
made solely by prosecutors. In Reed, the court held that the purpose of a special statute for diversion of first time drug offenders
was to provide rehabilitative treatment for accused drug offend149. People v. Reed, 112 Cal. Rptr. 493 (2d Dist. 1974), vacated, 46 Cal. App. 3d
625, 120 Cal. Rptr. 250 (2d Dist. 1975); State v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85, 121, 363 A.2d
321, 340 (1976), affd on rehearing, 73 N.J. 360, 375 A.2d 607 (1977).
150. See Goldstein, supra note 141, at 1016-17.
151. See notes 59-62 & accompanying text supra.
152. 112 Cal. Rptr. 493 (2d Dist. 1974), vacated, 46 Cal. App. 3d 625, 120 Cal.
Rptr. 250 (2d Dist. 1975). Upon rehearing, the California Court of Appeal reversed
the trial court's grant of diversion because it came after the defendant's trial had
commenced. 46 Cal. App. 3d at 629, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 252 (citing Morse v. Municipal
Court, 13 Cal. 3d 149, 529 P.2d 46, 118 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1974).
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ers. 153 The prosecutor argued that his consent was required before
the defendant could be diverted after trial. The court rejected that
argument because it reasoned that complete prosecutorial control
over the pre-trial diversion decisions would be violative of the
separation of powers doctrine.
In State v. Leonardis, 154 the New Jersey Supreme Court held
that a defendant could not be excluded from a pre-trial diversion
program on the ground that a drug offense is a "heinous crime."
The court reasoned that the defendant was entitled to a judicial
hearing focusing on his individual suitability for the program
before his application for participation in pretrial diversion could
be rejected. Moreover, the court held that the prosecutor must
state his reason for denying participation by any defendant in order to "alleviate existing suspicions about the arbitrariness" of
prosecutors' decisions. Iss
What the Leonardis court did not acknowledge was its own
role in reviewing prosecutorial disposition decisions in drug offense cases. One defendant in Leonardis was a college student
who had been arrested for possession of marijuana; another was
charged with possession of marijuana and conspiracy to possess
and distribute marijuana. 156 On their face, the offenses hardly
seem to be heinous crimes, even if one concedes that some "hard
drug" offenses are heinous crimes. What probably underlay the
denial of admission to the pre-trial diversion program was a prosecutor's unarticulated suspicions that both defendants were "key
distributors" or "pushers" of the illegal drugs. 157
The procedural analysis of the Leonardis court suggests an
attempt to impose judicial review of prosecutors' decisions to select some drug offenders for harsh disposition--criminal incarceration-and others for less restrictive disposition-release in the
community to work under supervision through the pre-trial diversion program. Explicit acknowledgement by the judiciary that
their review of prosecutorial pre-trial diversion decisions involves
supervision of the prosecutor's dispositional decisions would encourage the judiciary to define its own dispositional role in drug
offenses.
Such a definition would make visible the choices that must be
made in resolving society's ambivalence about criminal drug offenses. Actual criminal dispositions in drug cases should ultimately depend upon the values furthered. For instance, analyzing
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

112 Cal. Rptr. at 497.
71 N.J. 85, 363 A.2d 321 (1976).
/d. at 115, 363 A.2d at 332.
/d. at 90, 363 A.2d at 323.
/d. at 113-19, 363 A.2d at 336-39.
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the proposed drug-related robbery statute 158 in its broadest context should lead to an examination of whether a causal connection
between drug use and robbery exists in fact. By posing the question, decision makers may begin to address the interests to be
served by imposing criminal liability before deciding dispositional
policy. The prohibition of robbery protects the values of private
property and bodily integrity. A dispositional policy for robbery
should be based upon an analysis of the particular role the criminal law plays in upholding the interests of private property and
bodily integrity. Such an assessment could well lead to a dispositional rule requiring some period of incarceration for a convicted
robber. A more refined analysis would be required to determine
how long the period of incarceration should be.
In contrast, the values upheld by the typical drug offense,
those of health and individual liberty, are more difficult to explain.159 "A particular notion of individual physical and mental
health-that the free man is unshackled by the vices of . . .
drugs-is promoted" 160 by prohibiting individual drug use.' 61 Illicit drug users and distributors, of course, would define liberty
and health differently. For them, liberty is freedom from government interference, and in their view there should be no criminal
sanction for drug use. 162 For the drug user in particular, health or
well-being might be defined as a "continual high." Judicial dispositional policies for drug offenses must develop a method of accommodating these alternative definitions of liberty and health.
Addressing these divergent definitions of the basic values may allow courts to see that the use of the criminal sanction allows the
majority, through the regulatory process for drugs, to impose its
view of liberty and health upon the minority. Under these circumstances, a dispositional rule requiring probation or non-incarceration should be the preferred criminal disposition for all drug
offenses.
-.. -·
The divergent dispositional rules of probation for drug offenders and incarceration for robbers reflect the degree of confidence one should have in the criminal law as a means of social
158. See notes 136-38 & accompanying text supra.
159. Palmer, A Model of Criminal Dispositions, supra note I, at 9-10.
160. /d. at 17.
161. Under this view, the drug trafficker is preying on an individual in need of the
law's parens patriae. The assumption is that the community's health is protected by
state control of individual decision making. As this class of crimes is in fact structured, however, it upholds the value of the state process. Under this alternative view,
the state system of decision making with regard to drug use and distribution is protected by state direction of individual decision making. See generally J. WILSON, note
31 supra.
162. See Packer, The Aims o/ the Criminal Law Revisited· A Plea for a New Look
at "Substantive Due Process," 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 490 (1971).
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control. Despite some doubts, 163 it must be acknowledged that the
criminal law plays a unique and viable role in protecting the values of property and bodily security. Tort liability in the form of
conversion, or assault actions, or even new systems of social compensation for injury will not achieve the same fundamental social
ordering as the criminal sanction. On the other hand, the value of
health is not generally promoted through criminal law. Society is
becoming increasingly reluctant to use the criminal process to promote health even though that coercive process is sometimes necessary.164 In other words, the social institutions designed to promote
health-the family, the doctor-patient relationship, the hospital-have generally operated with little interference from the legal
system. 165
An interest analysis of the values that underlie the currently
employed framework of drug controls could lead appellate courts
to question legislative and administrative judgments about the
harm from drugs. 166 With a fuller understanding of both the positive and negative aspects of drug use, appellate courts could review the dispositional decisions of prosecutors in drug control
cases. Appropriate appellate dispositional rule making may lead
policy makers to become relatively indifferent at the sentencing
stage to whether a robber is or is not a drug user.
Ill.

ELIMINATING PAROLE: WHO SHOULD HAVE AUTHORITY
TO DETERMINE THE SOCIAL NEED FOR INDIVIDUAL
PREVENTION?

Consistent with the previously developed· framework for dispositional rule making, a comprehensive redefinition of the appellate court role requires an analysis of the proper relationship
between the courts and the correctional processes. In what follows, a detailed analysis of two general categories of sentencing
reform attempts to serve that end.
163. See Del Vecchio, Equality and Inequality in Relation to Justice, II NAT'L L.F.
36, 42-45 ( 1966 ).
164. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
165. Compare Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and
Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 340, 349-50 ( 1974) (suggesting the function of informed consent is "personalized" technical deeisions for the patients) with Goldstein,
For Harold Laswell· Some R4fections on Human Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent, and the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683, 690-98 ( 1975) (suggesting the function of
informed consent is to provide standards for doctors to use in the process of informing
patients of the consequences of their waiver of rights).
166. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Miller, [1976) 20 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2331
(Roxbury, Mass. Dist. Mun. Ct. 1976).

1979]
A.

MANDATORY SENTENCING SCHEMES

789

Allocating the Authority to Determine the Purposes of
Imposing Sanctions on Individuals

The Maine legislature eliminated parole in its recent comprehensive revision of its laws on sentencing and corrections. 167 With
the elimination of the institution of parole, the prison term determined by the sentencing judge should be the term of incarceration
in fact served by the offender. 168 The legislature articulated the
purposes of its dispositional reform, 169 so we may expect definite
sentences that are congruent with the society's aims.
Officials operating under the Maine statute (with stated purposes as divergent as crime deterrence and the elimination of inequities), 170 however, receive no greater guidance from this statute
than from previous schemes. Following prevailing practice, the
Maine legislature delegated to the sentencing judge the authority
to determine initially the need for "individual prevention" in prescribing sentences. And while the statute eliminates parole, it retains the optional sanctions of fine, unconditional discharge, and
probation or revocation oflicense.l 71 Hence, upon close examination, the Maine statute resembles most other statutory schemes,
since correctional officials still share decision making authority
with the sentencing judge in an undefined manner.
Under the Maine legislation, any sentence of more than one
year is deemed tentative; that is, the sentence must be evaluated
and reviewed by correctional officials. After the review, the Department of Corrections and Mental Hygiene can petition the
court for discretionary resentencing under either of two statutorily
defined circumstances. If, after some initial observation of the offender, the correctional officials decide that the trial court may
have based its sentence on "a misapprehension as to the history,
character, physical or mental condition of the offender," 172 the
Department may file a petition for an adjustment of the sentence.
Alternatively, the Department may file a petition if it doubts the
sentencing judge's ability to estimate "the amount of time that
would be necessary to provide for protection of the public from
such offender." 173
By authorizing the evaluation of both individual factors and
167. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 1251-1254 (West Supp. 1978).
168. Some commentators have vigorously advocated the elimination of parole as a
means of obtaining more certain sentences. D. FoGEL, " . . . WE ARE THE LIVING
PROOF . . . " ( 1975).
169. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 1151-1157, 1201-1206, 1251-1254 & official comments (West Supp. 1978).
170. !d. tit. 17-A, § 1151.
171. /d. tit. 17-A, § 1152(2)-(4).
172. /d. tit. 17-A, § 1154(2).
173. /d.
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social control needs, the statute in effect allows the Department to
recommend parole for the offenders. Then, when the sentencing
court receives such a petition, it has before it the Department's
"expert" evaluation of the offender's progress toward a "noncriminal way of life." 174 Moreover, the court is restricted by a legislative prohibition against increasing the sentence originally
imposed. 175 This process is the functional equivalent of traditional parole decision making; the difference is merely that the
administrative agency makes recommendations instead of actually
making the parole decision. The judge is the purported final decision maker. There is, however, little reason to believe that the
results of discretionary resentencing will be different from the results of the prevailing parole practices. 176
These legislative attempts to control the discretion of sentencing courts and correctional officials have little chance of success
because they fail to embody a theory of the allocation of dispositional authority. Such a theory should be built on the experience
gained by appellate courts in the administration of the criminal
law. At present, however, this experience is unavailable to the legislature because appellate courts have not assumed a policy-making role in dispositional decision making. Though Maine has a
legislative provision for appellate review of sentencing, the appellate court function in sentencing has never been made explicit. 177
Furthermore, a specialized appellate tribunal hears sentencing appeals. Thus, Maine's highest appellate court, which regularly engages in criminal law policy making, 178 never hears a sentencing
appeal.
Maine is not unique in this respect. Other states authorizing
review of sentences have generally limited the appellate courts'
role to the elimination of the occasional "grossly excessive" sentence rather than participation in dispositional policy making. 179
Again it must be emphasized that the appellate courts should be
the institution responsible for allocating decision-making authority between trial courts and correctional officials within the dispositional process. 180 To do so, the courts must first articulate the
purposes of imposing sentences in particular crimes and then allo174. /d.
175. /d. tit. 17-A, § 1154(4).
176. See Palmer, A Model if Criminal Dispositions, supra note I, at 35-46.
177. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2141-2144 (West 1977 & Supp. 1978).
178. See. e.g., State v. Wilbur, 278 A.2d 139 (Me. 1971), vacated sub nom. Wilbur
v. Robbins, 349 F. Supp. (D. Me. 1972), qfjd sub nom. Wilbur v. Mullaney, 473 F.2d
943 (1st Cir. 1973), remanded, 414 U.S. 1139, affdon rehearing, 496 F.2d 1303 (1st
Cir.), qfjd, 421 U.S. 684 (1974).
179. See Halperin, Sentence Review in Maine: Comparisons and Comments, 18 ME.
L. REV. 133 (1966).
180. See Palmer, A Model if Criminal Dispositions, supra note I, at 35-46.
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cate decision-making authority among the various officials to
achieve those purposes.

1.

Judicial Determination of the Need for Retribution and
General Deterrence

Assuming the existence of proper legal standards for determining whether state control is justified, it is proposed that trial
courts, with appellate court approval, ought to determine the maximum length of sentences based on the social control purposes of
general deterrence and retribution. 1R 1 For instance, rather than
try to determine whether a particular robber needs to serve the
long term authorized for robbery, 1R2 the trial and appellate courts
should determine the sentence for robbery, generally. In this effort, the appellate courts would focus on two factors: first, what
prison term best serves the need for general deterrence of robbery;
and second, what term serves the community's need for retribution resulting from the interference with the social values of property and bodily security.
Such appellate rule making is necessary because the long
maximum sentences usually authorized for the crime of robbery
serve a variety of purposes other than the provision of guidelines
as to the imposition of individual sanctions. 183 General deterrence and the need for retribution, defined in terms of specific social values and not by the individual characteristics of the
offender, should be used to establish the upper limits of the length
of sentences.
2.

Administrative Determination of the Need for Individual
Prevention

The proposal here is that the administrative agency, for example, the parole board or its equivalent, is the institution that
should consider individual factors in determining whether a particular person should be released before the expiration of his term.
Within that maximum sentence established through appellate dispositional rule making, the parole board should determine what
reasonable risks should be taken in allowing a particular individual to serve less than the maximum sentence.
181. !d. at 10-21.
182. A typical robbery statute authorizes maximum sentence of 15 years for simple robbery and 25 years for armed robbery. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§§ 2911.01-.02, 2929.11 (B)( I )-(2) (Baldwin 1978).
183. The maximum sentence authorized by the legislature is important in determining its "proportionality." See Coker v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 815 (1977). However,
the infliction of a particular sanction on an individual in some circumstances requires
a process of decision making that is "individualized." See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976) (Stewart, J., plurality opinion).
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For the parole board to make this determination, it would
have to address two general kinds of questions with respect to the
individual transgressor. First, is the release of this individual at
this time likely to lead to his reintegration into the community?
Within this broad question the board would examine, for instance,
what resources are available in the community and whether they
are available to this particular individual. 1s 4 Second, does the
community's interest in the value of liberty outweigh the risk that
this individual will again jeopardize a value legitimately protected
by the criminal law? While both questions are somewhat open
ended, they at least necessitate a more focused inquiry than do
existing decision-making practices, which allow both trial judges
and correction officials to weigh the more general purposes of dispositions. The more focused inquiry would also allow appellate
courts to supervise the use of individual factors in decisions about
release. 185
3.

Appellate Court Supervision of the Individual Prevention
Function

Appellate courts having occasion to review parole board decision making have generally imposed procedural requirements.
For instance, one appellate court has required parole boards to
give a statement of reasons when parole is denied. 1s 6 This practice has led litigants to assume that further "procedural reform"
rather than substantive policy analysis should be pursued before
the appellate courts.
Thus, in a group of consolidated cases 187 where the parole
board gave its reasons for denying parole, appellate counsel for
the prisoners attacked the procedures used by the board. 18s The
appellate court denied the claims and praised the parole board's
attempts to administer the process fairly under existing guidelines.
The court selected one case, that of Walter Beckworth, 189 to illustrate the operation of the guidelines and procedures developed by
the parole board.
184. This question is aimed at evaluating the community's tolerance for the particular individual who engaged in the prohibited activity. See Lasswell & Donnelly, The
Continuing Debate over Responsibility: An Introduction to Isolating the Condemnation
Sanction, 68 YALE L.J. 869 (1959).
185. See Palmer, A Model o.f Criminal Dirpositions, supra note I. at 11-21.
186. Monks v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 58 N.J. 238, 277 A.2d 193 (1971).
187. Beckworth v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 62 N.J. 348,301 A.2d 727 (1973).
188. Besides attacking the adequacy of the reasons given by the parole board, see
rd. at 359, 30 I A.2d at 733, counsel for appellants made several claims including: (I)
Jack of prior notification of materials in parole board's file, id. at 362, 30 I A.2d at 73435; (2) informality of the parole release interview and hearing, rd. at 363, 30 I A.2d at
735; and (3) Jack of counsel at parole release hearing, id. at 366, 301 A.2d at 736-37.
189. /d. at 351, 301 A.2d at 729.
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The case is one in which counsel for Beckworth could have
invoked the appellate court's policy-making role in an attempt to
win Beckworth's release. At the age of thirty-eight, Beckworth
killed a friend's wife. Beckworth, then estranged from his common law wife, 190 had moved into the home of a male friend, had
an affair with the friend's wife, and strangled her after an argument. Following a plea of no contest, 191 he was sentenced to a
term of fifteen to twenty years. He was first eligible for parole
four years after his incarceration but was denied parole when he
appeared before the board. Two years later, he was again denied
parole. Two weeks after the second denial, he escaped from
prison. After six months, Beckworth was recaptured and sentenced to an additional year for escaping. 192
A year after his escape, Beckworth was granted another hearing but was again denied parole. This time, however, Beckworth
appealed the denial and, on appeal, asked for and received a remand of his case to be heard by the board. Nine months later his
case was reheard, and the board again denied his parole. 193
Beckworth by this time had served eight years of his original
fifteen to twenty year sentence. In all three of the parole denials,
the board had noted his difficulties in relating to women. The
board's view was supported each time by a consulting psychologist who noted Beckworth's hostility toward women, "poor judgment," and his lack of insight into the "circumstances which
brought him to prison."l94
Although counsel for Beckworth thought it at least intuitively
unfair to condition Beckworth's liberty now on his character at the
time of the homicide, 195 counsel failed to turn that contention into
an appellate argument of fairness which might have demonstrated
that the parole board had exceeded its proper function. The
board gave as the reasons for its denial the fact that the "punitive
and deterrent aspects" of Beckworth's sentences had not been fulfilled.196 Thus the board assumed a dispositional function more
properly that of a sentencing judge. The mixing of the general
social control purposes of deterrence and retribution with assessments of Beckworth's unchanged condition skewed the decision in
favor of social control, generally. A decision-making model ofpa190. /d.
191. The plea is significant in that it requires the court to gamer information from
"other sources" rather than through "adjudication."
192. Beckworth v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 62 N.J. 348, 352, 301 A.2d 727,
729 (1973).
193. /d. at 350, 352, 30 I A.2d at 728, 729.
194. /d. at 352, 30 I A.2d at 729.
195. /d. at 359, 301 A.2d at 733.
196. /d. at 353, 301 A.2d at 729-30.
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role that maximized the value of liberty would have directed the
decision makers' inquiries toward the particular known risks in
the case before it. Using the facts as established, counsel for
Beckworth could have made a principled argument for
Beckworth's release.
A two-fold inquiry should have focused on the improper decision making by the parole board and the improper methods of
weighing individual risks. First, counsel should have maintained
that the parole board improperly emphasized the punitive and deterrent aspects of the sentence. The judge who is closest to the
criminal liability decision is in the best possible position to assess
the social need for retribution and general deterrence. This was
especially true in Beckworth's case, since there was no formal adjudication of his guilt. 197 Thus, counsel should have argued that
the parole board had construed its legislative mandate too
broadly.
Second, because the board failed to limit its inquiry to individual characteristics, neither the parole board nor the reviewing
court had access to the information which might have revealed the
unfairness inherent in the board's decision. The factors actually
evaluated included Beckworth's act of killing a woman, his "attempted" suicide, his three unstable marriages, his continuing projection of blame on the women for the marital failures, and factors
contained in reports from professional treatment staff. 198 Atten-·
tion should have been directed at a host of unasked (and, perhaps,
unanswerable) questions.
Even if one assumes the accuracy of the parole board's appraisal of those factors actually considered, the proper question for
the board was whether remaining in prison would aggravate
Beckworth's condition or hold forth any hope of improvement.
The more proper line of inquiry would have led a reviewing court
into a realistic assessment of this individual vis-a-vis the resources
available. For example, assuming Beckworth needs treatment, is
such treatment available in the community or even in prison?
Given the limited resources of a typical prison, it is unlikely that
proper treatment would be available there. Even were the parole
board to release the prisoner conditionally to obtain treatment,
such treatment would have to be available. One might inquire, in
this regard, whether the parole board and its parole counselors 199
investigated whether there were mental health facilities in the
community that might offer Beckworth treatment. Such a line of
inquiry is the means by which appellate defense counsel can assess
197. See note 191 supra.
198. 62 N.J. at 353, 301 A.2d at 730.
199. /d. at 355, 301 A.2d at 731.
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the functioning of the parole board and explore the reasoning
processes of the criminal administrative agency for an appellate
court.
This second line of inquiry seeks to direct the reviewing
court's attention to the tendency of parole boards to favor the values of social control over those of liberty. Such direction is especially needed in cases where deterrent and retributive aspects have
been vindicated in the original sentence for murder. Counsel
should ask whether the board has examined and rejected as unacceptable the conditions under which it might release the individual. In Beckworth's case, this would involve a difficult inquiry
into factors such as Beckworth's social and sexual relations with
women. If, for instance, Beckworth were not willing to seek treatment, but would report on his social life to his parole officer,
would he then be an acceptable risk in the community?
Before the suggested condition is rejected as "some unconstitutional invasion of privacy and liberty," 200 note that the particular decision is actuallly one of weighing conditional liberty against
nonliberty. In other words, would society prefer to let Beckworth
have limited conditional contacts in the community rather than
remain in prison for a longer period of time? A parole board
might answer this question by suggesting that prison is preferable
because "freedom" with state intrusion into one's sexual life does
not conform to the board's notion of liberty.
However, an appellate judge accepting this determination
would have to acknowledge openly that Beckworth is simply being held in a form of preventive detention for social control purposes. The policy choice would be even more apparent were the
resources for treatment available in the community but not in
prison. In that case, the court's approval of the board decision
would make visible to society the harsh consequences of its policy
choices in individual cases. It would also make the public and
other decision makers aware that proper treatment may never be
available in prison.
At a time when even prison administrators are admitting
their inability to rehabilitate, 201 the choice to keep Beckworth confined should appear unfair to the court. While the risk of
Beckworth's becoming involved in another homicide should be
acknowledged, it should not be determinative. 202 The value of
human life, like the value of liberty, must be risked in dispositional decision making. Beckworth appears to be a case in which
200.
201.
202.
Harm,

See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1975).
D. FoGEL, note 168 supra.
·
See Dershowitz, Indeterminate Confinement: Lelling the Therapy Fit the
123 U. PA. L. REv. 297, 320 n.85 (1974).

796

UCLA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:753

an appellate court with the power to review sentences 203 should
have held that the parole board had given the value of individual
liberty insufficient weight.
B.

Reforming Disposition Without Reference to Adjudication

In .general, the Maine reform seeks to establish new legal
standards for sentencing and correctional decisions with little reference to the evolving standards of criminal accountability. For
example, the Maine statute assumes we can have "sentences which
do not diminish the gravity of offenses" 204 without explicitly considering the nature of particular offenses. 205 On a metaphysical
. level, the legislature sought to encourage 'just individualization"
of sentences without a standard of what is "just" 206 or what are
"legitimate criminological goals." 207 In effect, the Maine legislature attempted to deal with the dispositional or punishment issues
as distinct items for reform.
In so doing, the legislature failed to take account of the interrelationship of punishment and responsibility. The average citizens thinks about crime in terms of its moral consequences. 208
The label "murder," for instance, carries with it the connotation
that the offender should be punished. 209 Law, on the other hand,
has not only moral consequences but coercive ones as well. As
demonstrated above, 210 the law separates the question of criminal
liability-adjudication-from the question of punishment-disposition. After a delineation of the distinctive features
of adjudication and disposition in legal decision making, an integration of the two functions adds to an overall understanding of
the criminal process. The Maine legislature failed to perceive that
203. See State v. Ward, 57 N.J. 75, 270 A.2d 1 (1970).
204. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1151(8) (West Supp. 1978).
205. See notes 35-50 & accompanying text supra.
206. Legal philosophy would :appear to be of great relevance to a further study of
sentencing. But until the broad school of legal philosophies allows the unique feature
of a legal system, legal decision making, to enter its debates, the influence of legal
philosophy on sentencing will be slight. Professor Graham Hughes, without specific
references to the problems of sentencing, has noted the failure of legal philosophers to
examine the nature of legal reasoning and decision making. See Hughes, Rules, Policy and Decision-Making, 77 YALE L.J. 411, 439 n.22 (1968). Although certainly worthy of further study, a meaningful integration of legal philosophy and judicial
dispositional rules is beyond the scope of this Article.
207. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1151(5) (West Supp. 1978).
208. As concepts, punishment and responsibility are metaphysicial notions whose
interrelationship deserves to be treated at length in books, not footnotes. See generally H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968). Significantly,
problems in this area are replete with concepts that are changing over time. See Lasswell & Donnelly, supra note 184, at 875.
209. See generally J. FEINBERG, DOING & DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY
OF RESPONSIBILITY 38-54 ( 1970).
210. See text accompanying notes 14-17 supra.
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reform of present dispositional practices requires reference to
present and fluctuating standards of adjudication.
In summary, an analysis of the Maine reform effort reveals
three defects in the legislature's decision to eliminate parole.
First, appellate courts rather than legislatures are the forum in
which the policy-oriented integration of adjudication and disposition necessary for reform should take place. The administration
of the criminal law necessitates an integration of its various functional stages. Second, the concept of criminal accountability is
open to question and reevaluation in the course of appellate court
deCision making. Thus, "the uncertainty, confusion and inconsistency"211 that exist in society's notions of criminal accountability
are most visible in modern appellate court decision making. Finally, the drafters of the Maine reform package had no theory of
dispositional decision making delineating the particular functions
of the courts and criminal administrative agencies in imposing
sanctions upon individuals.
IV.

A.

MANDATORY SENTENCING IN CALIFORNIA: A VARIATION
ON THE THEME OF OFFICIAL DISCRETION IN
SENTENCING

California's Determinative Sentencing Law

Prior to a recent reform, the California sentencing and correctional system epitomized the practice of indeterminate sentencing in America. The trial judge's sentencing decision was
essentially a choice between granting the offender some form of
supervised release or placing him in prison under the custody of
the Adult Authority for an indefinite term. For example, a person
convicted of robbery who was not placed on probation was sentenced to a term of incarceration that would last a minimum of
five years and could potentially last for life. 212 The Adult Authority periodically redetermined the term of confinement on the basis
of diagnostic tests, the convict's conduct in prison and his progress
towards reform. 213 In addition, the Adult Authority supervised
individuals whom it had released. 214 Granting the Adult Authority, a criminal administrative agency, a vast amount of discretion
over the disposition of an offender was consistent with the ethos of
211. See Lasswell & Donnelly, supra note 184, at 875.
212. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 213 (West 1970) (current version at CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 213 (West Supp. 1979)).
213. See 1. GOLDSTEIN, A. DERSHOWITZ & R. SCHWARTZ, supra note 24, at 61330, 641-56 (describing the previous California system).
214. See, e.g., In re Sturm, II Cal. 3d 258, 521 P.2d 97, 113 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1974);
In re Minnis, 7 Cal. 3d 639, 498 P.2d 997, 102 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1972).
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individualization that has dominated sentencing practices in
America.
Under a new mandatory sentencing scheme, however, the
trial judge is authorized to impose one of three terms of imprisonment when probation is not granted. Today, a person convicted of
robbery will either be placed on probation or incarcerated for two,
three, or four years. 215 If incarceration is chosen, the trial judge
must impose the middle sentence unless he finds, after a motion
and hearing, that aggravating or mitigating factors exist. 216 Although there is no statutory enumeration of the factors for aggravating or mitigating prison terms or for determining when
probation should be given, the trial judge must sentence in accordance with the rules of the Judicial Council.2 17 Release prior
to expiration of judicially imposed terms of imprisonment is based
on the review and recommendation of a new Community Release
Board to the sentencing court. This new Board also operates
under the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council. 218
Thus, the effectiveness of the California reforms depends
upon the effectiveness of the rules promulgated by the Judicial
Council. An examination of any of the rules reveals the basic approach: to allow the trial judge to consider as many factors as possible. For instance, the "criteria affecting probation" include the
likelihood of dangers to others, facts surrounding the crime, and
facts relating to the defendant. 219 Since the criteria are not exclusive, 220 the sentencing judge is free to give greater or lesser emphasis to particular factors he may choose. Apparently he may cite
anyfactor as a reason for granting or denying probation.
The rules do not, for instance, tell the trial judge whether
danger of addiction 221 is a reason for incarceration. Such a determination would require an analysis of the function that criminal
drug prohibitions play in preventing crime or protecting society.222 Apparently, the Judicial Council deems the individual trial
judge's analysis of the problem as sufficient since the judge need
only recite the reason for his decision. 223
Given the composition of the Judicial Council, the failure to
resolve the underlying policy issues in sentencing is not surprising.
The California Judicial Council is an appointed body consisting
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

CAL. PENAL CoDE§§ 213, 1170(a)(2) (West Supp. 1979).

/d.§ 1170(b).
!d.§ 1170(a)(2).
/d.§ 1170(d).
CAL. R. CT. 414.
CAL. R. CT. 408.
CAL. R. CT. 414(d)(1), (6).
See CAL. R. CT. 410(a), (d), (e).
CAL. PENAL CoDE§ 1170(c) (West Supp. 1979); CAL. R. CT. 443.
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of judges of the various courts, members of the bar, and members
of the legislature. 224 The state's constitution empowers the Council to establish the rules of practice of the courts and to perform
other duties defined by statute. 225 The newly promulgated sentencing rules define its general objectives in terms surprisingly
similar to those of the legislature. The Judicial Council states that
two objectives of its rules are "(a) protecting society, [and] (b)
punishing the defendant . . . . " 226 ln similar fashion, the legislature enacting the new mandatory sentencing schemes declared
"that the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment." 227
Such vague statements of purpose are unlikely to encourage the
Judicial Council to establish rules that provide meaningful guidance for the resolution of actual cases. 228
While the rules and statute require judges to state their reasons for the sentence,2 29 there is no indication that the offender
can appeal on the grounds that the trial judge's reasons reflect unsound dispositional policy. Rather, the Judicial Council will use
these reasons as empirical evidence in either revising its rules or
making recommendations to the legislature for modifying the statutes.230 Apparently, the convicted offender is supposed to treat
these often conflicting rules as valid and focus his appellate argument on the propriety of the trial judge's application of the rules.
But because appellate courts have assumed a larger policy-making
role in criminal law decision making generally, offenders of their
counsel should be encouraged to take a more aggressive attitude
towards the new rules. The California sentencing rules and the
legislation fail to mention the appellate judiciary which must
eventually resolve these policy conflicts.
B.

People v. Tanner: An Indication
Mandatory Sentencing

o.f the Judicial Response to

The recent case of People v. Tanner 231 illustrates the point. In
224. CAL CoNsT. art. 6, § 6.
225. /d.
226. CAL. R. CT. 410.
227. CAL. PENAL CoDE§ 1170 (West Supp. 1979).
228. Administrative rule making by courts through judicial councils has not usually resolved underlying policy conflicts. Professor Coffee has suggested in a slightly
different context that attempts to use such bodies to develop rules for sentencing leads
to the "problem of accountability" since judicial councils are not accountable to the
political process or organized professional groups. See Coffee, Repressed Issues of
Sentencing: Accountability, Predictability and Equality in the Era of the Sentencing
Commission, 66 GEO. L.J. 975, 1008 n.87 (1978).
229. CAL. PENAL CoDE§ 1170(c) (West Supp. 1979).
230. ld. §§ 1170.4-.6.
231. 23 Cal. 3d 16, 587 P.2d 1112, 151 Cal. Rptr. 299 (1978), vacated rehearing
granted (Feb. 8, 1979).
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Tanner, the California Supreme Court was asked to resolve the
conflict between two statutory provisions in the context of reviewing the sentence the trial judge had given a convicted robber. As
part of the current movement towards mandatory sentencing, the
California legislature recently prohibited trial judges from granting probation for anyone convicted of using a firearm to commit a
robbery. 232 Another section of the statute required that the use of
a firearm must be alleged in the indictment and found by the
factfinder. 233 Tanner met both criteria since he admitted the robbery at trial, and the jury found that he had committed the crime
with a firearm. 234
The trial judge charged with the responsibility of sentencing
Tanner, however, relied upon a previously enacted statute and
line of cases and struck the finding of firearm use. 235 Following
the dismissal of the special finding, the judge imposed a five-year
prison term, which he suspended on the conditions that Tanner
spend one year in county jail and that he undergo psychiatric
treatment. 236 He justified the sentence on the basis of the unusual
facts surrounding the robbery as developed in trial testimony and
the probation report. 237 Had the trial judge not dismissed the
finding of gun use, he would have been required, under the stat··
ute, to send Tanner to state prison. The state appealed.
In its initial Tanner opinion (rehearing was later granted and
the decision, therefore, was vacated), a plurality of the court rejected the state's argument that the later enacted mandatory gun
use statute forbidding probation for firearm felonies superseded
the older statute allowing dismissals by trial judges at sentencing.
The rejection of this argument required the plurality to discuss
explicitly the legislative intent in conjunction with the court's own
previous interpretations of similar statutory provisions for sen··
tencing. 238 Despite the political rhetoric indicating the legislative
intent that all robbers using a gun must go to state prison, the
plurality held that the legislature did not intend to overrule an
232. CAL. PENAL CoDE§ 1203.06(a)(l)(iii) (West Supp. 1979).
233. /d.§ 1203.06(b)(l).
234. 23 Cal. 3d at 22,587 P.2d at 1114-15, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 301-02.
235. /d. at 23,587 P.2d at 1115, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 302.
236. /d.
237. Tanner, a security guard, in admitting the robbery at trial, claimed he was
only trying to convince the store owner to resubscribe to the security service for which
Tanner worked. The victim of the robbery, a clerk, testified that Tanner had engaged
in a friendly conversation and instructed the clerk to call the police and identify him,
Tanner, as the robber. The probation report indicated that Tanner had never been
arrested or convicted before and that Tanner's employers had all given him good
recommendations. The investigating police detective did not believe Tanner should
be sentenced to state prison for the offense. The report recommended a six-month jail
term and a period of probation. /d.
238. /d. at 24-35, 587 P.2d at 1116-24, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 303-11.
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entire body of judicial doctrine preserving the judiciary's prerogative to dismiss part of indictments in the "interests of justice." 239
The concurring opinion would have reached the same result
but on constitutional grounds: the legislature meant to forbid probation in Tanner's case, but such prohibition violated the principles of separation of powers. 240 Moreover, the determination of
"penalty enhancement factors" was a judicial function that the
legislature had, in effect, delegated to the local prosecutor, an executive officer. The dissenting justices took issue with the concurring opinion's constitutional interpretation and the plurality's
interpretation of legislative intent. 241
This abbreviated analysis of Tanner suggests two things
about the relationship of appellate courts to mandatory sentencing
reform. First, the plurality of the court, at least, demonstrated a
willingness to examine new "mandatory" schemes in light of previous judicial interpretations of legislative dispositional policies.
Where the court perceived a conflict in those policies, it appeared
prepared to resolve those conflicts in terms of its perception of
proper dispositional policy. A trial judge trying to avoid a harsher
result, as in Tanner, or an ingenious defense counsel will often be
able to find a conflicting statement of penal policy somewhere in
the morass of penal and correctional laws in California or in the
judicial interpretations of those policies. Second, the concurring
opinion in Tanner illustrates how easily a dispositional issue can
be transformed into a constitutional issue when sentencing reform
ignores the role of appellate courts. Given the political climate in
California supporting mandatory sentencing, the Tanner case
should certainly receive extended analysis. At the very least, Tanner indicated an unwillingness on the part of some appellate
judges to resolve all conflicts in the administration of new dispositional schemes through a mechanistic reference to the maxim that
"it is the legislature's function" to determine punishment.
By failing to resolve the basic conflicts, the new sentencing
rules and the legislation invite a resolution on a constitutional basis. Prior to the adoption of the new legislation, the California
appellate judiciary had already begun to question the operation of
the indeterminate sentencing law. 242 Although these decisions involved complex constitutional analyses, the courts raised basic
239. /d. at 35, 587 P.2d at 1124, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 311.
240. /d. at 39, 587 P.2d at 1126, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 313 (Bird, C.J., concurring and
dissenting).
241. /d. at 44-52, 587 P.2d at 1129-35, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 316-22 (Clark & Richardson, J J ., dissenting).
242. See, e.g., In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972)
(declaring the indeterminate life sentence for a second conviction of indecent exposure as "disproportionate" to the crime).
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policy questions about the nature of offenses and the terms of incarcerations. For example, the California Supreme Court's constitutional analysis of "disproportionality" included a
consideration of the penological purposes served by particular offenses.243
In sum, the California legislation demonstrates some basic inadequacies of present legislative reform of sentencing. First, like
the Maine legislature, the California legislature has isolated only
the "punishment" issues for reform. 244 By stating the issues in this
way, the legislature can employ a stated purpose of punishment to
disguise the more basic motivations behind social control in our
society. 245 Second, although the California legislature saw a relationship between correctional decision making and sentencing decisions, there is no uniform dispositional theory. Such a theory
must include the individual's right to test the legality of his disposition because it is his liberty that is at stake. 246 The determination of the legality of the criminal process ultimately rests with the
appellate courts. Thus, the California scheme fails to acknowledge the role of the courts in shaping criminal dispositional decision making. 247
To encompass the variety of goals and values upheld through
the criminal law, a code should include a statement of the general
purposes of the criminal law before the particular purposes of sentencing.248 Such a statement of purpose should disregard the nomenclature of punishment249 since the term adds little to an
understanding of legal decision making. A general purposes section of a code combined with an explicit statement that the appell~te courts are empowered to develop rules for sentencing would
be a legislative authorization for courts to resolve conflicts of purposes in individual cases. Without an explicit discussion of the
issue of legal decision making in dispositions by appellate courts,
little more than variations on the theme of official discretion 250
through legislative reform of sentencing can be expected.
243.
(1974).
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
(1958).
249.
27.
250.

In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 923, 519 P.2d 1073, 1082, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649, 657
CAL. PENAL CoDE§ 1170(e) (West Supp. 1979).
See text accompanying notes 181-211 supra.
See text accompanying notes 205-13 supra.
See text accompanying notes 231-41 supra.
See Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 401

See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. DERSHOWITZ & R. SCHWARTZ, supra note 24, at 724See Palmer, A Model of Criminal Dispositions, supra note I, at 53-59.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

That sentencing practices and policies need reform has not
been questioned in this Article. What has been seriously questioned, however, is the wisdom of the movement towards legislatively mandated sentencing. These legislative attempts to modify
the discretionary aspects of sentencing and parole are by and large
based on simplistic conceptions of the interrelationship of the various components of the criminal process. This Article's resistance
to present "reform packages" is an attempt to develop a legal
framework for determining the limits of the policy-making role of
particular officials in the disposition of individuals.
Appellate courts should perform an important role in both
guiding dispositional policy making and legitimating the roles of
various dispositional decision makers. This Article has demonstrated, for example, that mandatory sentences for "illegal" gun
possession raise fundamental questions for legislatures and courts
about the role of police in the disposition of individuals. Appellate courts should recognize the implicit legislative delegation to
police of a crime prevention function in the definition of the illegal gun possession offense. Further, appellate courts must acknowledge their own power to limit the crime prevention role of
police through a variety of doctrines.
In other areas, this Article has demonstrated that appellate
courts must develop systematic theories of social control. Sentencing policy for drug offenses must be developed in the context
of answering the following question: What is the particular and
appropriate role of the criminal process in the social control of
drug abuse? Lurking beneath this issue is the larger question of
the degree to which an "inquisitional" model of the criminal process should be used for certain crimes. The key policy makers
upon whom appellate court attention should focus in this area are
prosecutors.
In addition to illustrating the role of appellate courts in developing systematic legal theories for disposition, the Article
briefly surveyed two types of sentencing reforms that are likely to
dominate public debate. One such reform, the elimination of parole, is intended to make sentences more definite; but a critical
examination of one such proposal has revealed that discretion persists under this proposal.
This Article argues strongly against such reform because it
assumes that decision makers can separate the punishment issues
from the responsibility issues. The suggestion here is that in reviewing parole board decisions, courts should define the unique
dispositional role of parole boards: to assess and evaluate individual risks. Under appellate court supervision, sentencing judges
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should assess the social risks posed by the individual's conduct.
Both prevailing practices and proposed reforms allow trial judges
and parole boards to justify their decisions by emphasizing the
individual and social risks presented by the individual's conduct.
Another fashionable sentencing reform is legislative delegation of specific rule-making power to commissions and study
groups. 251 The analysis proposed here suggests that this strategy is
unworkable. The legislature's failure to acknowledge the role of
appellate courts in its sentencing reform should not lead one to
conclude that the courts will not play an important part in these
reforms. Commissions, for all their positive aspects, lack the
moral authority and perspective necessary to formulate dispositional policy that relates to the individuals involved in the criminal process. Many of these persons are in fact both offenders and
victims. 252
Despite the current intellectual fashionability of mandatory
sentencing and the growing political popularity of such reform,
the hope raised here is that the call for mandatory sentencing will
be resisted. Reform of our present sentencing practice should involve at least three major components. First, the reform should
require policy clarification and articulation. The mere assertion
that rehabilitation fails does not alone constitute a promulgation
of policy by legal decision makers. Second, sentencing reform requires new concepts of the appropriate mechanisms of dispositional decision making. Importing concepts from adjudication
such as "presumptive sentencing" does not answer basic questions
such as who must ultimately determine whether general deterrence ought to be the goal. Third, facing these two large issues
requires a method of value analysis and a method of resolving
conflicts among values. While all decision makers engage explicitly or implicitly in value analysis, the contention here has been
that appellate courts must ultimately assume this role within the
modern criminal process.

251. See Schwartz, Riform ofthe Federal Criminal Laws: Issues, Tactics, and Prospects, 41 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. I, 22-25 (1977).
252. See Goldstein, The Meaning of Calley, NEW REPUBLIC, May 8, 1971, at 1314, reprinted in J. GOLDSTEIN, A. DERSHOWITZ & R. SCHWARTZ, supra note 24, at
1022-23.

